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iAbstract
This thesis examines the role of financial frictions for international business cycles
and policymaking in open economies. The analyses are based on two-country DSGE
models with leverage-constrained financial intermediaries who can extend credit to
home and foreign firms. In the first essay, I assess the role of banks’ balance sheet
exposure to foreign assets for the cross-country transmission of shocks. It is shown
that this role depends on the nature of a particular shock. Balance sheet exposure
is essential for global co-movement in the case of capital quality shocks but does
not play a decisive role conditional on other types of shocks. In the second essay, I
analyze whether it is desirable to use unconventional monetary policy to stabilize
country-specific shocks in a monetary union with financial frictions. It is shown
that country-specific rules are not necessarily associated with higher welfare from
the viewpoint of a structurally symmetric union. In particular, when the indicators
of the rules are highly correlated, union-wide rules are preferable. In the third essay,
I provide an explanation for the well-known puzzle that international consumption
risk-sharing is relatively low compared to what theoretical models would predict
given the high level of international financial-market integration. In particular, it
is shown that a portfolio chosen by financial intermediaries instead of households
does not necessarily yield the highest possible degree of international consumption
risk-sharing.
Zusammenfassung
Gegenstand dieser Dissertation ist die Rolle von Finanzmarktfriktionen fu¨r inter-
nationale Konjunkturzyklen und daraus resultierende Politikimplikationen. Die
Analysen basieren auf Zwei-La¨nder DSGE Modellen mit international agierenden
Finanzintermedia¨ren. Im ersten Aufsatz wird untersucht, ob der Anteil ausla¨ndis-
cher Kapitalanlagen am Bankvermo¨gen eine Rolle fu¨r die U¨bertragung von Schocks
zwischen La¨ndern spielt. Es kann gezeigt werden, das dies von der Art des jeweiligen
Schocks abha¨ngt: Ein ho¨herer Anteil ausla¨ndischer Kapitalanlagen fu¨hrt nur dann
zu einer ho¨heren Synchronisierung von Konjunkturzyklen wenn letztere durch soge-
nannte Capital-Quality-Schocks verursacht werden. In zweiten Aufsatz untersuche
ich, ob es wohlfahrtssteigernd ist, unkonventionelle Geldpolitik zur Stabilisierung
la¨nderspezifischer Schocks in einer strukturell symmetrischen Wa¨hrungsunion mit
Finanzmarktfriktionen zu verwenden. Es wird gezeigt, das dies nicht immer der Fall
ist: Wenn die Politikregeln auf Indikatoren beruhen, die hochkorreliert zwischen
den La¨ndern sind, fu¨hren unionsweite Regeln zu ho¨herer Wohlfahrt als la¨nderspezi-
fische. Der dritte Aufsatz liefert eine Erkla¨rung fu¨r relativ geringe internationale
ii
Risikoteilung, verglichen mit dem was u¨bliche Modelle, basierend auf dem ho-
hen Grad an Finanzmarktintegration, vorhersagen: Ein internationales Portfolio,
was von Finanzintermedia¨ren anstelle von Haushalten gewa¨hlt wurde, fu¨hrt im
gegebenen Modell zu suboptimaler Risikoteilung.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The last decade has revealed a number of new challenges for macroeconomic
research. The financial crisis which started in 2007 reminded us starkly of the
great importance of financial factors for the real economy. In particular, a salient
feature of the crisis was a serious interruption of financial intermediation (see,
e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011; Brunnermeier, 2009). This has motivated many
macroeconomists to incorporate banks into otherwise standard general equilibrium
models in order to understand their role for business cycles.1 In addition, the
fact that a shock originating in the U.S. subprime mortgage market was promptly
followed by recessions in most countries of the world (c.f. Imbs, 2010), drew attention
to the substantial increase in cross-border holdings of financial assets and liabilities
since the early 1990s (cf. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) and its potential role
for the fast-paced spreading of the crisis. Hence, to better understand the role
of financial market integration for international business-cycle comovement, open
economy models started to frequently incorporate a financial sector.2 On the policy
side, the financial crisis and the subsequent global recession induced central banks
around the world to engage into a number of unprecedented unconventional policy
interventions, with the aim to redress interrupted financial markets. This led to a
new strand of macroeconomic literature, assessing domestic as well as international
effects of credit facilities implemented by central banks.3
This thesis contributes to the understanding of the role of financial intermediaries
for international business cycles (chapters 2 and 4). In doing so, it also proposes a
1See, e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2011), Gerali et al. (2010), Meh and Moran (2010), to name a few.
2While earlier contributions such as Devereux and Yetman (2010), Dedola and Lombardo
(2012) and Devereux and Sutherland (2011b) treat financial intermediaries as a veil, e.g., Kollmann
et al. (2011), Guerrieri et al. (2012), Dedola et al. (2013), Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) and
Dra¨ger and Proan˜o (2018) explicitely model internationally diversified financial intermediaries.
3While, e.g., Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), Gertler and Karadi (2011), Cu´rdia and Woodford
(2011) and Del Negro et al. (2011) frame their analyses in the context of closed economy models, e.g.,
Dedola et al. (2013) and Nuguer (2016) also take into account the global reach of unconventional
monetary policy measures.
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solution to one of the key puzzles in international macroeconomics – the fact that
consumption risk-sharing is relatively low despite the high level of financial market
integration (chapter 4). Furthermore, it contributes to the understanding of the
welfare effects of unconventional monetary policy in an international context, more
specifically, in the context of a monetary union (chapter 3).
The analyses are based on two-country DSGE models which incorporate a
banking sector a` la Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Gertler and Karadi (2011).
This or slightly modified setups of the banking sector have been used in various
accounts of the recent financial crisis. Following this practice ensures comparability
with existing literature. The two-country version of the model developed in this
thesis features final goods market integration as well as asset and deposit market
integration. Integration of asset markets is modeled by assuming that intermediaries
can purchase financial claims on goods producing firms at home and abroad. In
chapters 2 and 4, I assume that banks endogenously choose the portfolio composition
with the purpose of optimally hedging country-specific banking risk (see, e.g.,
Dedola et al., 2013). I solve the optimal portfolio choice problem using the method
proposed by Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a). In chapter 3, I model
international portfolio choice by means of a CES function which facilitates a
second-order approximation of the model which is necessary for welfare analyses.4
A common explanation of the global scale of the crisis reads that a drop in the
value of some assets related to the U.S. subprime mortgage market instantly forced
leveraged investors around the globe – holding this particular type of assets – to
deleverage by selling assets across the board. This caused a general decline in asset
prices, aggravating the initial events and spreading the crisis to further sectors
and countries. The explanation suggests that there are two sources of international
comovement in real and financial variables: First, balance sheet exposure to foreign
assets enables a direct transmission of shocks across borders via the asset side of
banks’ balance sheets. Second, regardless of the degree of balance sheet exposure
in quantitative terms, price equalization in integrated financial markets leads to
international business-cycle comovement. The theoretical model I develop in chapter
2 incorporates both channels. Nevertheless, I show that it is conditional on the type
of shock whether the balance sheet channel plays an important role and, hence,
whether the degree of direct exposure to foreign assets is crucial for international
comovement in real and financial variables. In particular, the share of foreign assets
in banks’ portfolios is essential for global comovement in the case of capital quality
shocks but does not play a decisive role for cross-country correlations conditional
on technology shocks and shocks to the net wealth of banks. The latter two have
4The usage of the CES function to determine international portfolios has become more and
more popular in recent years. In combination with a different setup of the banking system it has
been used by, e.g., Auray et al. (2016), Poutineau and Vermandel (2015), Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
(2015) and Dra¨ger and Proan˜o (2018).
3been at centerstage in previous theoretical accounts of the role of balance sheet
exposure for global comovement (see, e.g., Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Yao, 2012;
Devereux and Yetman, 2010).
As Draghi (2013) phrased it, “[t]he particular challenge of the ECB is to operate
in a multi-country environment: one monetary policy for 17 countries that constitute
our currency union“. This is a particular challenging task, given that business
cycles between member countries are less than perfectly correlated. So far, most
theoretical accounts of unconventional monetary policy in open economies assume
country-specific monetary authorities interested in maximizing their own welfare.
To provide orientation for policymakers in a monetary union, chapter 3 of this
thesis expands existing literature by analyzing whether unconventional monetary
policy can and should be used to stabilize country-specific shocks in a monetary
union. I show that rules based upon country-specific indicators are not necessarily
associated with higher welfare. In particular, whenever the central bank resorts
to indicators, which are highly correlated between countries, union-wide rules
are preferable. The intuition behind this result is second-best reasoning: To the
extent that financial frictions cannot be fully eliminated, a reduction in volatility
has positive and negative effects on welfare. The cross-country correlation of the
indicators affects the degree of volatility associated with different rules and also
influences the welfare effects of volatility which can explain the results. To my
knowledge, there is only one paper by Tischbirek (2016) which addresses this kind
of question. However, he focuses on the effects of government debt purchases on
fiscal policies and uses a model which does not feature financial frictions.
An important function of international financial markets is to allow countries
to insure themselves against country-specific risk. Hence, given the substantial
increase in financial market integration in the last three decades, it is surprising, that
consumption risk-sharing is modest at best and has increased much less throughout
the same period of time (e.g., Kose et al., 2009). In the fourth chapter of this
thesis, I built upon the model developed in chapter 2 and propose an explanation
for this international risk-sharing puzzle: The – quite realistic – assumption that
financial intermediaries choose the international portfolio instead of households can
account for relatively low consumption risk-sharing compared to what could be
achieved at the given level of financial market integration. This can be explained
with the presence of a financial friction which drives a wedge between the incentives
of households and financial intermediaries. As households are primarily concerned
about consumption risk, a portfolio optimally chosen by households would coincide
with the portfolio which yields the highest possible degree of consumption risk-
sharing. In my model, banks are owned by households, hence, they internalize the
objectives of households. However, due to an agency problem between bankers
and depositors, they have an additional motive, namely the maximization of net
4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
wealth. Therefore, unless consumption and net worth fluctuations are perfectly
correlated, financial intermediaries choose a portfolio which deviates from the
one which maximizes consumption risk-sharing. These results are in line with
those of Maggiori (2017), who shows that the existence of a financial friction,
which introduces an additional motive for bankers, can account for several empirical
findings related to risk-sharing between financially asymmetric countries. The results
suggest a role for macroprudential policy in improving international consumption
risk-sharing. I show that while a direct reduction of the financial friction has a
positive impact on international consumption risk-sharing, the introduction of a
countercyclical capital buffer does not have the same desirable consequences.
Chapter 2
Banks’ Balance Sheets and the
International Transmission of
Shocks
Abstract
I propose a theoretical framework to think about the global comove-
ment in real and financial variables during the recent financial crisis.
The framework is used to address one question in particular: What
is the role of banks’ balance sheet exposure to foreign assets for the
international transmission of country-specific shocks? I show that this
role depends on the nature of the shock: Balance sheet exposure is
essential for global comovement in the case of capital quality shocks
but does not play a decisive role for cross-country correlations condi-
tional on other shocks, e.g., technology shocks.
Keywords: International Business Cycles, Financial Frictions, Capi-
tal Quality Shocks, Consumption Risk Sharing, Portfolio Choice
JEL Classification: E44, F30, F44
2.1 Introduction
The recent economic crisis with its origin in the U.S. financial sector has been
characterized by an unprecedented global comovement in real as well as financial
variables. Given the substantial increase in cross-border holdings of financial assets
and liabilities since the early 1990s (see, e.g., Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007), a
common explanation of the global scale of the crisis is centered around international
balance sheet exposure of highly leveraged financial institutions: A drop in the value
of some assets related to the U.S. subprime mortgage market forced balance sheet
constrained investors around the globe – holding similar portfolios – to deleverage
by selling assets across the board. This caused a general decline in asset prices,
5
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aggravating the initial events and spreading the crisis to other sectors and other
countries.
This paper assesses whether the degree of global comovement in real and
financial variables is directly linked to the degree of banks’ balance sheet exposure
to foreign equity. To this end, I set up a two-country real DSGE model featuring
leverage-constrained financial intermediaries modeled as in Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) who hold risky claims on home and foreign
capital as in Dedola et al. (2013) and Carniti (2012). I use this framework to
analyze a type of shock which has recently gained importance in the business-cycle
literature due to its ability to capture the broad dynamics of the subprime crisis
(Gertler and Karadi, 2011) – a shock to the quality of capital. I find that for capital
quality shocks, a sufficiently high share of foreign assets in banks’ portfolios leads
home and foreign output to move into the same direction. On the contrary, the
degree of balance sheet exposure only plays a minor role in the transmission of
technology shocks and shocks to the net worth of bankers – shocks which have
been at centerstage in previous accounts of the role of balance sheet exposure for
global comovement (see, e.g., Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Yao, 2012; Devereux
and Yetman, 2010). This is an interesting result as it suggests that we can only
assess the consequences of the substantial increase in cross-border asset holdings
for international comovement if we find out which shocks are currently the most
important drivers of business cycles.
How is it possible that balance sheet exposure matters for the transmission of
capital quality shocks but not for other shocks? A capital quality shock directly
reduces the value of the corresponding assets in banks’ balance sheets whereas
technology shocks and net wealth shocks reach the asset side of balance sheets
mainly via asset prices, which are equalized through international arbitrage in this
kind of model.
Recently, capital quality shocks have been given much attention in the closed
economy literature, as they can reproduce a comovement of real and financial
variables very close to the one observed since the beginning of the ‘Great Recession’
of 2008-2009 (see, e.g., Furlanetto and Seneca, 2014; Gertler and Karadi, 2011;
Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011). Furthermore, various empirical studies show that this
kind of shock was the most important driver of business-cycle fluctuations in recent
years (Sanjani, 2014; Liu et al., 2011; Justiniano et al., 2011). In the light of these
findings, my results suggest that including capital quality shocks into the research
agenda of the international business-cycle literature might constitute an important
step forward in explaining the global scope of the recent economic crisis.
Similar theoretical accounts of the risks resulting from balance sheet exposure
so far have only considered technology shocks and shocks to the net worth of
investors. They do not feature a banking sector. Using a two-country New Keynesian
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model with leverage-constrained investors, Dedola and Lombardo (2012, p. 319)
argue that price equalization in integrated financial markets leads to business-
cycle comovement “quite independently of the exposure to foreign assets in the
balance sheet of leveraged investors”. Their model features perfect deposit market
integration which leads to an equalization of credit spreads, while in my model
deposit rates are only partly equalized due to the presence of a debt-elastic interest
rate yield.1 A similar contribution is the model by Yao (2012) which features
non-separable preferences. She comes to the conclusion that a higher degree of
balance sheet exposure leads to higher international business-cycle comovement
in the case of technology shocks. However, varying the degree of balance sheets
exposure only has quantitative effects. Dedola et al. (2013) and Carniti (2012) have
proposed two-country frameworks with banks and integrated financial markets,
very similar to the one in the present paper. They also analyze the effects of capital
quality shocks under different degrees of balance sheet exposure, however, they are
mainly interested in the question how unconventional monetary policy should be
conducted in this context.
While much evidence has been brought forward that the balance sheet channel
has played an important role in the financial crises of the nineties (see, e.g.,
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000), empirical evidence with respect to the direct role of
foreign asset holdings during the ‘Great Recession’ is mixed. For instance, using a
cross-country dataset, Rose and Spiegel (2010) come to the conclusion that exposure
to U.S. assets cannot account for the observed cross-country differences in decline
in output growth. On the other hand, using a similar methodology but additionally
including data on consumption and total domestic demand to measure recessions,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) find that exposure to foreign assets worked as an
important channel of transmission during the recent crisis.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the model. Section
2.3 provides the calibration. In section 2.5, I present and discuss the results. The
final section concludes and gives an outlook.
2.2 Model
The setup of the model closely follows Dedola et al. (2013), except for the modeling
of international intermediaries (subsection 2.2.2). It is assumed that the world
consists of two countries with symmetric structures, each inhabited by a continuum
of agents of equal size.
1In section 2.5.3, I show that the degree of foreign exposure still plays an important role for
the cross-country transmission of capital quality shocks, even if I consider a version of the model
which features highly correlated credit spreads.
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Each country features a financial intermediation sector. The role of interme-
diaries is to transfer funds between households and final goods producers who
use the loans to finance investment into physical capital. Intermediaries face an
endogenously determined constraint on their leverage ratio, motivated by a simple
agency problem which drives a wedge between saving and borrowing rates.
The two-country version of the model developed here features final goods market
integration as well as asset and deposit market integration. To allow for these
multiple interlinkages, I have to abstract from complete international consumption
risk sharing. Allowing the net foreign asset position to be adjusted via two margins
- equity and bond trade - might imply two unit roots in a first-order approximation
of the model (see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). Hence, I introduce two
stationarity-inducing features, an endogenous discount factor, which dates back to
Uzawa (1968), and a debt-elastic interest rate yield.
Integration of asset markets is modeled by assuming that intermediaries can
purchase financial claims on final goods producing firms at home and abroad as in
Dedola et al. (2013) and Carniti (2012). This introduces an endogenous portfolio
choice problem as returns to equity are subject to country-specific risk. I solve
this problem using the method proposed by Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008;
2011a) (see section 2.4).
For simplicity only home country equations will be displayed. Foreign variables
will be denoted with an asterisk.
2.2.1 Households
Within each household, there are two member types, workers and bankers. While the
worker supplies work to final goods firms and deposits to banks, the banker manages
a financial intermediary and transfers retained earnings back to her household
when the lifetime of the bank ends. Within the family, there is perfect consumption
risk sharing, which allows to maintain the representative agent framework. As
in Gertler and Karadi (2011), it is assumed that a fraction 1 − f of household
members are depositors, while a fraction f are bankers. Between periods there is a
random turnover between the two groups: with probability θb a banker will stay
a banker and with probability 1 − θb she will become a depositor. The relative
proportions are kept fixed. New bankers are provided with some start-up funds
from their respective households.
The lifetime utility of a representative home worker, who draws utility from
consumption Ct and disutility from labor Lt, is given by
Et
∞∑
k=0
Θt+k
(
lnCt+k − χ
L1+φt+k
1 + φ
)
,
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where φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and χ determines
the weight of disutility of labor in the utility function. Variable Θt represents the
endogenous discount factor of households chosen to ensure stationarity as explained
below.
Households save by depositing funds at domestic and foreign banks (see 2.2.2 for
details). Total deposits held between t−1 and t, denoted by Dt−1, are equivalent to
one-period riskless real bonds paying the gross real rate of return Rt−1. Furthermore,
households provide labor to final goods firms and receive the real wage wt. Hence,
the home household’s budget constraint is given by
Ct +Dt = Rt−1Dt−1 + wtLt + Υt,
where Υt denotes net profits from the ownership of firms (financial and non-
financial).
The endogenous discount factor is determined as follows
Θt+1 = Θtβ(CA,t),
Θ0 = 1,
where CA,t is aggregate home consumption. Using aggregate consumption in the
endogenous discount factor ensures that the household does not internalize the effect
of her consumption decision on the discount factor, which simplifies calculations
considerably (cf. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2003) and Devereux and Yetman (2010) the following functional form of the
endogenous discount factor is assumed
β(CA,t) = ωc(1 + CA,t)
−ηc . (2.1)
Parameter ηc drives the elasticity of the discount factor with respect to consumption.
Parameter ωc captures the steady-state savings propensity. Note that the discount
factor decreases in CA,t, i.e., whenever a country has relatively higher consumption
in the present, it discounts future consumption more heavily and, hence, saves less.
The latter implies lower consumption in the future and, therefore, the economy
returns to the initial state.
Hence, the household’s first-order conditions for the optimal choice of labor and
consumption are given by
wt = χ
Lφt
λt
, (2.2)
and
1 = β(CA,t)EtΛt,t+1Rt, (2.3)
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with the household’s real stochastic discount factor defined as
Λt,t+1 ≡ λt+1
λt
, (2.4)
where λt denotes the marginal utility of consumption given by
λt = C
−1
t . (2.5)
2.2.2 International Intermediaries
To simplify matters, I implicitly assume that households hold their deposits with
savings banks which – according to the needs in the financial system – channel the
funds to home and foreign banks via international intermediaries. Total deposits of
home households are given by Dt = DH,t +DF,t.
Allowing deposits to freely flow between countries, would induce a unit root.
Therefore, it is assumed that home deposits can only be channeled to foreign
banks by purchasing one-period bonds from international intermediaries. The latter
charge a small interest-rate premium on the real interest rate, hence, home and
foreign deposits rates are only imperfectly correlated. The premium depends on
the real net foreign bond position of the respective country (see, e.g., Hjortsoe,
2016) This assumption adds realism to the model and ensures stationarity (see,
e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). As in Hjortsoe (2016), I assume
Rt = R
∗
tΦ(DF,t), (2.6)
where R∗t is the foreign real riskless rate of return. It is assumed that the country-
specific rate charged by international intermediaries is increasing in the deviation of
the external household debt position (real debt is given by −DF,t) from its steady
state, i.e., Φ(·)′ < 0 and Φ(0) = 0. As in Hjortsoe (2016), the following functional
form is chosen for the debt-elastic interest-rate premium
Φ(DF,t) = (1− ωdDF,t).
Parameter ωd is the yield sensitivity of debt.
Profits of international intermediaries are equally split between households in
the two countries. Note that rates of return on home deposits and bonds (equivalent
to deposit holdings with foreign banks, DF,t) are equalized due to arbitrage.
2.2.3 Banks
The setup of the banking sector closely follows Dedola et al. (2013). Home financial
intermediaries channel funds from home and foreign households to home and foreign
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final goods producers, fulfilling the double role of investment as well as commercial
banks. In addition to obtaining funds from households, banks also raise funds
internally by accumulating retained earnings. The balance sheet of home bank i is
given by
QtSiH,t +Q
∗
tSiF,t = D
B
i,t +Ni,t, (2.7)
where Qt (Q
∗
t ) denotes the price of the home (foreign) capital asset. Deposits at bank
i, stemming from home and foreign households, are denoted by DBi,t = DiH,t +D
∗
iH,t.
Variable SiH,t (SiF,t) denotes state-contingent claims on future returns of a unit of
capital used in final goods production in the home (foreign) country one period
later, whose gross rate of return is given by Rk,t (R
∗
k,t). Intermediary i’s net worth
is given by Ni,t. It evolves according to the following equation
Nit = Rk,tQt−1SiH,t−1 +R∗k,tQ
∗
t−1SiF,t−1 −Rt−1DBi,t−1.
As can be seen from the equation above, any growth in banks’ equity capital above
the riskless rate depends on the premia Rk,t − Rt−1 and R∗k,t − Rt−1 and on the
quantity of assets. Financial intermediaries cannot fund assets with an expected
discounted premium below zero. In a frictionless financial market, risk-adjusted
premia would always be zero. In my model, due to the presence of a leverage
constraint, the spread is positive. As will be seen later, it covaries negatively with
GDP, as banks’ inability to obtain funds increases during bad states of the economy.
As it is assumed that each period a fraction 1-θb of bankers exits the business with
i.i.d. probability and pays out accumulated earnings to their respective households,2
a banker maximizes the terminal value of her net worth given by
Vt = max Et
∞∑
k=0
(1− θb)θkbΘt+kΛt,t+k+1Ni,t+k+1.
To motivate the requirement to build up net worth, the following moral hazard
problem is assumed: At the beginning of each period, before the shocks realize and
any other transactions take place, the banker can choose to divert the fraction λb
of available funds back to the household. The cost associated with this fraud is
that the depositors recover the remaining fraction 1 − λb and force the banker into
bankruptcy. Therefore, for households to be willing to deposit funds with the bank,
the following incentive constraint must hold
Vi,t ≥ λbBi,t, (2.8)
2This arrangement precludes bankers from aggregating so much net worth that the incentive
constraint becomes irrelevant for them.
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with Bi,t ≡ QtSiH,t + Q∗tSiF,t denoting total bank assets. To solve the banker’s
maximization problem define the objective of the bank recursively as
Vi,t = max Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1[(1− θb)Ni,t+1 + θbVi,t+1],
and conjecture that the value function is linear in assets and net worth,
Vi,t = νiH,tQtSiH,t + νiF,tQ
∗
tSiF,t + ηi,tNi,t.
The banker’s problem consists in choosing the amount of home assets, SiH,t,
foreign assets, SiF,t and deposits D
B
i,t such that terminal net worth is maximized
and the incentive constraint holds. It can be solved using the Lagrange method.3
The solutions for the coefficients are given by
νH,t = EtΩt,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt) (2.9)
νF,t = EtΩt,t+1(R
∗
k,t+1 −Rt) (2.10)
ηt = EtΩt,t+1Rt, (2.11)
where
Ωt,t+1 = β(CA,t)Λt,t+1 [(1− θb) + θb (ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1)] , (2.12)
where φt ≡ ηtλb−νt is the leverage ratio (see below). Variable Ωt,t+1 can be interpreted
as the stochastic discount factor of the banker. It differs from the household’s
stochastic discount factor due to the presence of financial frictions. The discount
factor is a key variable for the determination of international portfolio positions.
The difference between the two agents’ discount factors drives one of the results of
this paper: The fact that in this model the portfolio decision is made by the banker
instead of the household leads to inefficiently low insurance of country-specific
consumption risk (cf. section 2.5.1). The reason is that bankers have a motive
in addition to the maximization of lifetime utility, namely, the maximization of
terminal net wealth. Note that the subscript i was dropped as the coefficients
exclusively depend on aggregate variables.
A further first-order condition is given by
νH,t = νF,t ≡ νt ⇔ EtΩt,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1R∗k,t+1. (2.13)
It is the first-order condition relevant for optimal portfolio choice as will be explained
further in section 2.4.
3Detailed derivations can be found in the appendix (section A.1).
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Assuming that the incentive constraint binds,4 it can be expressed in terms of
the coefficients of the value function
Bt =
ηt
λb − νtNt = φtNt, (2.14)
where φt is the ratio of intermediated assets to net worth, which can be referred to
as the leverage ratio. Note that it is determined endogenously in this model.
Finally, the law of motion for aggregate net worth can be derived as
Nt = Nn,t +Ne,t ΞN,t (2.15)
Ne,t = θb
[(
(Rk,t −Rt−1)− Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1
Bt−1
(Rk,t −R∗k,t)
)
φt−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1 (2.16)
Nn,t = ωb[Qt−1SH,t−1 +Q∗t−1SF,t−1], (2.17)
where Ne,t denotes existing bankers’ net worth, Nn,t denotes new bankers’ net
worth and ωb is the fraction of the assets given to new bankers by their households.
Variable ΞN,t denotes an exogenous disturbance to the net worth of existing bankers.
2.2.4 Final Goods Firms
Final goods producing firms can sell their products to home and foreign consumers
in a perfectly competitive market.
The Cobb-Douglas production function of the representative final goods firm is
given by
Yt = At(ΨtKt−1)αL1−αt , (2.18)
where Yt denotes output, At technology and Ψt capital quality. Parameter α
denotes the output elasticity of capital. Labor Lt is provided by households in
the same country only. Capital Kt−1 was bought from capital goods producers in
the same country in the previous period at price Qt−1. To obtain funds to finance
capital purchases, the firm issues state-contingent securities to home and foreign
intermediaries at the same price. Each period, after being productive, the firm has
to pay back capital returns on the securities issued in the previous period. As in
Gertler and Karadi (2011) I assume a shock to the quality of capital to provide
a source for exogenous variations in the price of capital. It can be interpreted as
the sudden realization that much of the capital installed is of lower quality than
previously thought. As capital provides collateral to banks, banks’ balance sheets
will be contracted in response to a negative capital quality shock. The law of motion
4Parameters and steady-state values are chosen such that the incentive constraint binds in the
steady state. Holding shocks small enough guarantees that the incentive constraint also binds in
a stochastic environment.
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for capital is given by
Kt = It + (1− δ)ΨtKt−1, (2.19)
where It is aggregate investment and δ denotes physical depreciation.
The first-order conditions of the final goods producer’s profit maximization
problem are, therefore, given by
Rk,t+1 =
αYt+1
Kt
+ (1− δ)Ψt+1Qt+1
Qt
, (2.20)
and
wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
. (2.21)
The firm earns zero profits state-by-state, hence, it simply pays out the ex post
return to capital, Rk,t, to the financial intermediary.
2.2.5 Capital Goods Firms
Competitive capital goods firms produce capital only for the domestic market using
national final output as input facing investment adjustment costs (in consumption
units). Adjustment costs are assumed to be proportional to the aggregate past
capital stock as in Dedola et al. (2013).5 Their functional form is given by
f (·) = ηI
2
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)2
δKt−1
It
, (2.22)
with ηI > 0, denoting the inverse elasticity of investment with respect to price of
capital. The capital goods producer chooses It to maximize lifetime profits given by
Et
∞∑
k=0
Θt+kΛt,t+k {Qt+kIt+k − [1 + f (·)] It+k} .
From the first order conditions, I obtain the real price of one unit of capital
Qt = 1 + ηI
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)
. (2.23)
Due to flow investment costs, capital goods firms can earn profits outside the steady
state. These profits are distributed lump-sum to the households.
5Using adjustment costs proportional to the change in investment, instead, results in excessive
volatility of investment and – implied by this – excessive volatility of other real variables such
as output. This was also pointed out by Dmitriev and Roberts (2013), however, for two-country
models with perfect risk-sharing.
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2.2.6 Market Clearing and Aggregate Resource Constraint
The capital market clearing condition states that in each country, the current value
of total installed capital has to be equal to the total value of state-contingent claims
on future returns of capital
QtKt = Qt(SH,t + S
∗
H,t). (2.24)
International final goods market clearing is given by
Yt + Y
∗
t = Ct + C
∗
t + [1 + f(·)]It + [1 + f ∗(·)]I∗t . (2.25)
The home aggregate resource constraint is derived from the aggregation of the
budget constraint over home households, considering profits from the ownership of
non-financial firms, retained earnings from exiting bankers and transfers to new
bankers
Yt +Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1R
∗
k,t−1 −Qt−1S∗H,t−1Rk,t−1 +DF,t−1Rt−1 + 0.5ΥIFIt
= Ct + [1 + f(·)]It +Q∗tSF,t −QtS∗H,t +DF,t, (2.26)
where ΥIFIt = (R
∗
t −Rt)DF,t are profits from international financial intermediaries
which are equally split between countries.
Bonds are in zero net supply, i.e.,
DF,t = −D∗H,t,
where D∗H,t denotes foreign households’ deposits in home banks or, more specifically,
foreign international bond holdings invested in home banks.
The equilibrium conditions of the full model are collected in the appendix
(section A.2.1).
2.3 Calibration
Table 3.1 reports the baseline calibration and its sources. The time unit is one
quarter. Most parameters are quite standard and do not need to be discussed.
The weight of labor in the utility function was chosen to ensure that a household
devotes one third of her time to work.
The parameters of the banking system, λb, the divertable fraction of assets, θb,
the average lifetime of banks, and ωb, the transfer to entering bankers, are taken
from Gertler and Karadi (2011). They choose these values to hit three targets: a
steady-state interest rate spread of 100 basis points, a steady-state leverage ratio
of four and an average lifetime of a bank of 10 years.
16 CHAPTER 2. BANKS AND INTERNATIONAL COMOVEMENT
Parameter Description Value Source
Households
φ inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
χ utility weight of labor 3.492
ηc parameter from discount
factor
0.010 Devereux and Sutherland
(2009)
ωc parameter capturing steady-
state savings propensity
0.996
ωd yield sensitivity to debt 0.010 Hjortsoe (2016)
Capital goods firms
ηI inverse elasticity of invest-
ment with respect to price of
capital
1.728 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Final goods firms
α output elasticity of capital 0.330 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ depreciation rate 0.025 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Financial intermediaries
λb fraction of divertable assets 0.381 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ωb transfer to entering banks 0.002 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
θb quarterly survival rate of
banks
0.972 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Exogenous processes
ρψ persistence of capital quality
shock
0.66 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρA persistence of technology
shock
0.95 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρN persistence of net wealth
shock
0.66
σψ, σA, σN standard deviation of shocks 0.01
Table 2.1: Parameters
Parameter ηc in the endogenous discount factor was taken from Devereux and
Sutherland (2009). In general, it should be noted that this parameter can have
considerable implications for the international transmission of shocks. Hence, it
should be set to a small value. However, choosing it to be too small induces a unit
root in a first-order approximation of the model. The same is true for ωd, the yield
sensitivity to debt, which is calibrated as in Hjortsoe (2016).6 Given ηc = 0.01 and
the steady-state value of consumption, parameter ωc was chosen as to guarantee an
annual steady-state interest rate of 4%, i.e., a steady-state value of β(CA) of 0.99.
The three exogenous variables At, Ψt and ΞN,t are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes. Persistency and standard deviation of the technology shock are taken
from Gertler and Karadi (2011). The persistency of the net wealth shock is set to
0.66 which is equal to the persistency of the capital quality shock. The reason is
that the capital quality shock, as well as the net wealth shock directly affect stock
6In section 2.5.3, I discuss the robustness of the results with respect to choosing a lower value
of ωd, i.e., a higher degree of deposit market integration.
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variables and, hence, feature a high endogenous persistency. The size of the capital
quality shock is set equal to the standard deviation of the other shocks.
2.4 Portfolio Indeterminacy and Solution
Method
Recall home banks’ first-order condition νH,t = νF,t which can be rewritten as
EtΩt,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1R
∗
kt+1.
Evaluated in the non-stochastic steady state, this equation becomes
Rk = R
∗
k,
and, approximated up to first order,
EtRk,t+1 ≈ EtR∗k,t+1.
Hence, in the steady state and evaluated up to first-order, both assets pay the same
return. This implies that all possible compositions of banks’ portfolios, given by
Bt = QtSH,t +Q
∗
tSF,t, pay the same return in the non-stochastic steady state and
in expectations, evaluated up to a first order. Therefore, international portfolio
choice is indeterminate up to first-order accuracy. The economic intuition behind
this indeterminacy problem is that the two capital assets are only distinguishable in
terms of their risk characteristics which can only be captured with an approximation
of second-order or higher (Devereux and Sutherland, 2008).
It can be shown that only steady-state portfolio shares matter for the (first-
order) dynamics of the remaining variables. To find the steady-state portfolio
shares, I use the method proposed by Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a).
It is based on a second-order approximation of the portfolio equations and a
first-order approximation of the non-portfolio parts of the model. Recently, other
local and global methods have been proposed by other authors,7 however, the
method developed by Devereux and Sutherland is particularly appealing as it
uses well-known perturbation techniques and can be quite easily incorporated into
otherwise standard programs used to solve DSGE models, e.g., Dynare. In chapter
4, I provide a more detailed description of this solution method.
7The methods proposed by Tille and van Wincoop (2010) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2005)
also employ perturbation around a non-stochastic steady state to find international portfolios
while Coeurdacier et al. (2011) and Juillard (2011) propose to find international portfolios by
approximating DSGE models around the risky steady state. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015)
are able to solve a model featuring an international portfolio choice problem globally by using
continuous time.
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2.5 Results
In this section, I first present and briefly discuss the optimal steady-state portfolio
share obtained with the Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a) method. In
subsection 2.5.2, the main transmission mechanisms of the model are discussed.
To this purpose, I compare the impulse responses of an environment in which the
portfolio is optimally chosen by banks to those prevailing in an environment with
an arbitrary foreign asset share of 0 and to those which result from an environment
of financial market autarky. In the last subsection, I briefly discuss the robustness
of the results with respect to varying certain model features.
2.5.1 Steady-State Portfolio Holdings
Steady state portfolio holdings in this model are defined as
γ ≡ Q
∗Sf
Q∗Sf +QSh
=
QS∗h
Q∗S∗f +QS
∗
h
,
i.e., the share of foreign capital holdings in home banks’ portfolios, which – due
to symmetry – is equal to the share of home capital holdings in foreign banks’
portfolios.
Using the benchmark calibration, steady-state foreign portfolio holdings amount
to 0.64, i.e., financial intermediaries hold portfolios with a foreign bias. This result
is fairly robust to varying parameter values. Data on international portfolio holdings
show that developed countries exhibit an equity home bias of 60-80%, i.e., a γ
between 0.2 and 0.4 (see, e.g., Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012). The model at hand
cannot replicate this characteristic of international financial markets – a weakness
shared by many other two-country models with endogenous portfolio choice. There
are also various contributions proposing certain model features which lead to home
bias in international portfolios. Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) provide an excellent
review of this literature. As the focus of the present paper is different, I refrain
from extending the model in a way that it matches data on international portfolio
holdings more closely.
In models with international portfolio choice, agents choose portfolio holdings
as to optimally insure against country-specific risks. In most of the literature on
international portfolio choice, households undertake the portfolio choice decision.
Their objective is to choose the portfolio which ensures the best hedging of country-
specific consumption risk. A feature of my model is that bankers undertake portfolio
decisions instead of households8 which is a justified assumption given that in
8The models by Dedola et al. (2013) and Carniti (2012) feature the same setup of the banking
system as my model, however, they do not analyze the implications of portfolio choice by bankers
in detail. In Dedola and Lombardo (2012), Yao (2012) and Devereux and Yetman (2010) so-called
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the real world a large part of international portfolio holdings is managed by
financial intermediaries (Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012). This assumption, however,
has important implications for international portfolio choice and consumption risk-
sharing. Measuring the latter as the correlation between home and foreign marginal
utilities (see, e.g., Nuntramas, 2011), it can be shown, that the foreign asset share
chosen by bankers is, generally, lower than a foreign asset share which maximizes
international consumption risk-sharing. This is an interesting feature of the model.
In fact, it might help reconcile theory with empirical evidence on relatively low
foreign asset holdings and modest degrees of international consumption risk sharing
despite open financial markets (see, e.g., Kose et al., 2009). Therefore, I will further
analyze the implications of international portfolio choice by banks for international
equity positions and consumption risk-sharing in chapter 4.
2.5.2 Impulse Response Analyses
In this section, I analyze the impulse responses to an adverse home capital quality
shock and compare them to the impulse responses to shocks which have been
considered in previous analyses of the role of balance sheet exposure for the
international transmission of shocks, in particular technology shocks and net worth
shocks. The aim of the present paper is not to perfectly capture realistic dynamics,
but to analyze the role of the financial sector for the global comovement observed
in recent years. Hence, I will focus on a discussion of the responses of GDP as
the main indicator of real economic activity and of those financial variables which
illustrate the international transmission well.
Figure 2.1: Banks’ Balance Sheets under Financial Market Integration
I begin by explaining the international transmission of the shocks via the
financial sector along the balance sheets of home and foreign banks under financial
market integration (figure 2.1). Suppose a negative technology shock hits the
production function of the home economy. As a direct effect, the return to home
capital and home investment demand are reduced. This exerts downward pressure
‘investors’ undertake the portfolio decision, but their objective is also the maximization of lifetime
utility, i.e., the stochastic discount factor relevant for international portfolio choice is equivalent
to the households’ one.
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on the price of home capital, Qt and thereby affects banks’ balance sheets negatively.
Hence, this shock transmits from the real to the financial sector primarily via prices.
Under financial market integration, capital prices are nearly equalized due to
the equalization of expected returns. Therefore, this shock also reaches foreign
banks balance sheets mainly via asset price equalization. Now, suppose that a net
wealth shock hits home banks’ balance sheets, i.e., Nt drops exogenously. The home
bank has to deleverage to meet balance sheet constraints. This fire sale of assets
exerts downward pressure on asset prices, thereby affecting the asset side of banks’
balance sheets. As before, foreign banks balance sheets are mainly affected via price
equalization. When a capital quality shock hits the home economy, the same price
equalization channel as for the previous two shocks comes into effect. However,
there is an additional effect on the financial sector. Recall that the capital quality
shock not only hits the production function, but also destroys part of the capital
stock. As the capital stock is equal to the capital claims issued to banks, the decline
in home capital quality causes a devaluation of home capital assets, i.e., of SH,t
and S∗H,t. The foreign bank suffers from this decline in asset values proportionately
to its home asset holdings.
I now turn to the impulse response analysis. I assume three environments in
which the shocks hit the home economy: 1) financial market autarky, i.e., neither
deposit nor capital market integration,9 2) financial market integration, i.e., deposit
and capital market integration, and full home bias, i.e., γ = 0, and 3) financial
market integration, i.e., deposit and capital market integration, and an optimal
portfolio, i.e., γ = 0.64. The second setting can be seen as a rather hypothetical
case in which banks are allowed to trade financial assets – therefore, asset returns
are equalized in expectations – however, actual international asset holdings are set
to zero. This setting allows me to single out the price equalization channel, as the
balance sheet exposure channel is turned off by construction.
Capital quality shocks
Figure 2.2 shows the impulse responses to a capital quality shock in the home
country. The solid blue line and the dashed black line display the impulse responses
under financial market integration. The solid blue line gives the impulse responses
under full home bias and the dashed black line depicts the impulse responses under
optimal diversification.
9In the present model, in which both countries produce the same good, financial market
autarky implies trade autarky.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Capital Quality Shock
The size of the effects on the foreign banking system depends very much on the
share of home assets in foreign banks’ portfolios, γ. Foreign banks’ net worth is only
affected very little under the assumption of full home bias and the foreign spread
(defined as the difference between the expected return to capital and the foreign
deposit rate) even decreases. The effects on the real economy also differ largely.
Under full home bias (γ = 0), the adverse shock in the home country actually
triggers a small boom in the foreign economy, while under optimal diversification
(γ = 0.64) the recession is synchronized in the short run. The reason for the different
transmission of the same shock is that under optimal diversification, foreign banks
are affected through a direct devaluation of some of their assets, in particular
through a direct devaluation of S∗H,t, and through asset price equalization while
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under full home bias only the latter channel plays a role. The price equalization
channel works through an equalization of expected returns on capital due to
arbitrage. The equalization of expected returns pushes capital demand and, hence,
capital prices into the same direction during the initial periods following the shock.
Price equalization attenuates the effects of the shock in the home economy while
it is a channel of financial contagion for the foreign economy. If only the price
equalization effect is at work, which is the case for γ = 0, the foreign economy
initially even profits from the shock in the home country. The reason is that it
can increase exports to the home economy where demand did not drop as much as
under financial autarky because there the financial accelerator was attenuated. If
banks hold diversified portfolios, i.e., γ = 0.64, foreign banks are directly affected
by the home shock to a similar extent as home banks. This activates a powerful
balance sheet mechanism in the foreign economy: as can be seen in figure 2.2,
foreign banks’ net worth drops by a similar amount as in the home economy. Due
to the leverage ratio constraint, foreign banks have to further reduce their asset
holdings.
The result that home and foreign output are negatively correlated under full
home bias but positively correlated under a diversified portfolio is robust to
variations of the trade sector of the model. In particular, a version of the model
with trade in imperfectly substitutable home and foreign goods and potentially
sticky prices yields qualitatively the same results.
Other shocks
The impulse responses to the net worth shock and the technology shock can be
found in the appendix. As before, the solid blue line gives the impulse responses
under full home bias (γ = 0) and the dashed black line depicts the impulse responses
under optimal diversification (γ = 0.64). The effects of the technology shock on
the home economy are similar to those of the capital quality shock. The initial
responses are more pronounced and the impulse responses do not display a hump
shape as there is only the direct effect on the production function which is, however,
larger than for a capital quality shock of the same size. The effects of the net worth
shock – a purely financial shock – on the real economy are quite small which has
already been observed by Dedola et al. (2013).
With respect to the role of γ for the international transmission of these shocks,
it can be seen that the degree of exposure matters much less and only quantitatively
in the case of technology shocks and almost not at all in the case of net worth
shocks. As explained above, the reason is that in response to these shocks, financial
contagion arises mainly through asset price equalization. In this regard, my results
resemble those of previous accounts of the role of balance sheet exposure for the
international transmission of shocks (cf. Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Yao, 2012).
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However, my results deviate from those of Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and
Yao (2012) in that the correlation of home and foreign GDP for technology and net
worth shocks is negative in my model. As their models differ from mine in various
respects, I cannot conclusively say which features are responsible for the different
cross-country correlations. However, when running some robustness checks, I
found that the international comovement of output conditional on technology
shocks depends very much on the modeling of the trade sector. For example,
introducing a more sophisticated international trade sector with home and foreign
goods and sticky prices as in Dedola and Lombardo (2012) into my model yields
a positive correlation of output across countries, if the trade elasticity is low enough.
To sum up, whether balance sheet exposure matters for international contagion
depends on the type of shock. The reason is that technology and net worth shocks
are mainly transmitted via an equalization of asset prices, whereas capital quality
shocks are additionally transmitted through direct valuation effects. My results
imply that an evaluation of the risks of balance sheet exposure must go beyond an
analysis of unconditional cross-country correlations. Instead, we need to find out
which shocks are the most important drivers of international business cycles.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, I assess the sensitivity of my results with respect to altering certain
model features in a way that my model more closely resembles the setup used in
related literature, e.g., Dedola and Lombardo (2012).
Degree of Deposit Market Integration
In Dedola and Lombardo (2012) and Dedola et al. (2013) international bond markets
are perfectly integrated which implies perfect equalization of credit spreads in a
first-order approximation of the model. This might have implications for cross-
country correlations and the role of balance sheet exposure therein. The reason
for this is that the equalization of spreads also implies a high synchronization of
leverage ratios, even if balance sheet exposure is low. In the given setup, however,
allowing bonds to freely flow between countries implies a unit root in a first-order
approximation of the model. Therefore, I refrain from allowing frictionless trade
in bonds. Nevertheless, in my model, a higher synchronization of spreads can be
achieved by decreasing the friction in international deposit markets, i.e., by choosing
a lower value of ωd.
Figure A.3 in the appendix shows the impulse responses to a negative home
capital quality shock for ωd = 0.001. Given the higher degree of deposit market
integration, the initial response of foreign GDP in the scenario with financial
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market integration and full home bias (γ = 0) is altered. Now, initially, foreign
GDP also slightly drops in response to an adverse home capital quality shock.
Furthermore, the responses of the spreads and leverage ratios differ much less
between the scenarios of full home bias (γ = 0) and optimal portfolio diversification
(γ = 0.71). Nevertheless, although the price equalization channel becomes more
important when deposit market integration is higher, it still holds that balance
sheet exposure matters significantly for international comovement in the presence
of capital quality shocks, while it plays a much smaller role when, e.g., technology
shocks drive the business cycle.
Sticky Prices
As sticky prices are known to affect the risk sharing properties of assets (Engel and
Matsumoto, 2009) and to ensure better comparability to the analysis by Dedola
and Lombardo (2012), I also analyze a version of my model with trade in home
and foreign goods and sticky prices. Section A.4.2 of the appendix contains a brief
summary of this model version and the corresponding impulse response figures.
The main results regarding the cross-country transmission of capital quality
shocks, technology shocks and net wealth shocks under different degrees of balance
sheet exposure remain – by and large – unchanged: Balance sheet exposure is
essential for global comovement in the case of capital quality shocks but plays a
much smaller role for cross-country correlations conditional on technology shocks
and net wealth shocks. A difference to the original model is that, in response to an
adverse home technology shock, foreign GDP drops below its steady state value
for approximately one period if balance sheet exposure is high, while it increases
directly under the assumption of γ = 0. Furthermore, I find that the cross-country
correlation of GDP conditional on technology shocks changes its sign depending on
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods (ι). For a reasonable
value of ι = 1.5, the model exhibits a strong negative initial response of foreign
GDP to a negative home country technology shock under all three setups of the
financial market.
2.6 Conclusion
By estimating closed economy DSGE models, various authors have recently shown
that capital quality shocks are the “key drivers of business-cycle fluctuations”
(Justiniano et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011; Sanjani, 2014, p. 23). In an open economy
context, – in empirical as well as theoretical studies – these shocks have been given
little attention, so far. Considering technology and net worth shocks, previous
theoretical accounts of the role of balance sheet exposure for the international
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transmission of shocks came to the conclusion that the share of foreign assets
in investors’ portfolios matters at most quantitatively for the synchronization
of business cycles (Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Yao, 2012). My model extends
existing research by studying the international transmission of capital quality
shocks and the role of balance sheet exposure of leveraged financial intermediaries
therein. I show that conditional on capital quality shocks, balance sheet exposure
has an important impact on international business-cycle synchronization. In fact,
moving from a setting with negligibly low foreign portfolio holdings to a model
with completely diversified portfolios changes the sign of the correlation of home
and foreign output from negative to positive. This is an important finding as it
suggests that an evaluation of the potential risks of cross-country asset holdings
must go beyond an analysis of unconditional cross-country correlations. To gain
more insights into the question which role price equalization and balance sheet
exposure have played during the ‘Great Recession’ one needs to find out which
shocks are the most important drivers of international business cycles.
Furthermore, I find that the international transmission of capital quality shocks
is quite robust to changes in the model while the cross-country correlation of GDP
conditional on technology shocks changes its sign depending on the setup of the
trade sector. The cross-country correlation of output for net worth shocks is always
negative. These results cast some doubt on the explanatory power of technology
shocks and net worth shocks with respect to the global scope of the recent financial
crisis. Instead, my analysis suggests that incorporating capital quality shocks
and international balance sheet exposure into a model with leverage-constrained
financial intermediaries can help us to account for the high global comovement in
real and financial variables in the recent past.
An obvious path for future research is to estimate a version of the model.
Such an exercise will allow me to determine whether the transmission mechanisms
I highlight in this theoretical work are empirically relevant. In particular, the
theoretical exercise showed, that balance sheet exposure is essential for global
comovement in the case of capital quality shocks. The latter have not entered the
research agenda of the international business-cycle literature, yet. Therefore, I plan
to contribute to existing research by analyzing the joint role of capital quality
shocks and balance sheet exposure for the global scope of the recent economic
crisis.

Chapter 3
Unconventional Monetary Policy
in a Monetary Union
Abstract
I analyze the adoption of unconventional monetary policy measures
in a monetary union. To this end, I lay out a two-country monetary
union model with balance-sheet constrained financial intermediaries
and central bank credit policy. The framework is used to compare the
welfare implications of union-wide versus country-specific optimal
simple unconventional monetary policy rules. It is shown that –
despite the presence of country-specific shocks – country-specific rules
are not necessarily associated with higher welfare from the viewpoint
of a structurally symmetric union. Instead, to the extent that the
central bank reacts to indicators which are highly correlated between
countries, union-wide rules can be preferable. When considering
structural asymmetries between countries, there is evidence that the
introduction of unconventional monetary policy limits incentives to
reform financial structures from the viewpoint of a financially less
stable country.
Keywords: Unconventional Monetary Policy, Optimal Simple Rules,
Welfare, Heterogeneous Monetary Union, Financial Frictions
JEL Classification: E44, E52, E58, F45
3.1 Introduction
It is widely known that joining a monetary union inevitably impairs the ability of
monetary policy to address country-specific shocks. The common nominal interest
rate adjusts proportionally to union-wide circumstances, which might cause either
too much or too little stabilization in single countries. Furthermore, given that the
nominal exchange rate between member countries is fix, nominal devaluations –
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which have been occasionally used to prompt productivity in individual countries
in the past – are ruled out.
This paper raises the question, whether it is desirable to use unconventional
monetary policy to stabilize country-specific shocks in a monetary union. To this
end, I lay out a two-country DSGE model with leverage-constrained financial
intermediaries. The model features international trade in goods and assets, a
common currency and a union-wide nominal interest rate. As in Gertler and Karadi
(2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), I assume that the common central bank
can expand credit to banks (“liquidity facilities”) and firms (“corporate sector
purchase programs”). Unconventional policy is conducted by following a feedback
rule which responds to financial indicators such as the credit spread or credit growth.
In particular, I compare the welfare implications of optimal simple rules1 based
upon country-specific indicators to the corresponding outcomes under rules that are
based upon union-wide indicators. In the baseline version of my model, I assume
that countries are symmetric. However, structural heterogeneity is an important
factor when discussing the conduct of unconventional policies in a monetary union.
When some countries of a monetary union rely more heavily on central bank credit
than others, while costs and risks are born by the union as a whole, incentives
to reform financial structures might be misaligned. Therefore, I also consider a
modified version of the model in which one country has a more sound financial
system than the other. As the order of the approximation needs to be chosen in
the light of the research question, the model is solved up to second-order.
A key finding of the analysis is that, under some circumstances, union-wide
rules provide higher welfare than their country-specific counterparts despite the
presence of country-specific shocks.2 In particular, whenever the central bank reacts
to indicators which are highly correlated between countries, a union-wide rule might
be preferable over a country-specific rule. As in Dedola et al. (2013), this finding
can be rationalized with the fact that I consider a second-best environment in
which policymakers cannot fully eliminate financial frictions or their consequences.
Unconventional monetary policy can reduce some of the additional volatility caused
by financial frictions,3 especially, in the economy hit by the shock. However, it can
also fuel volatility by “overstabilizing” the country spared by the shock, especially
when the unconventional instrument reacts to union-wide indicators. In general, a
reduction in volatility is welfare-improving as it enhances consumption smoothing.
On the other hand, in the second-best environment considered here, some degree of
1Optimal simple rules are feedback rules whose reaction coefficients are chosen such that the
welfare of an individual household is maximized.
2Note that in the symmetric case, union-wide and country-specific welfare are perfectly
proportional.
3The excess volatility caused by financial friction is a result of what is commonly referred to
as “financial accelerator”, i.e., the real effects of shocks originating in the real or financial sector
are amplified due to the presence of financial frictions.
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volatility interacts with the financial friction to stimulate precautionary behavior,
such as precautionary saving and capital accumulation, which also has a positive
effect on lifetime utility.4 In the given setup, the trade-offs between the differing
effects of unconventional monetary policy on average volatility and, further, between
the differing effects of volatility on union-wide welfare can be tilted towards the
positive or the negative depending on how the rule is formulated, i.e., which
indicators the central bank reacts to.
When considering financially asymmetric countries – in particular, I consider
the case in which one country has implemented a countercyclical capital buffer
while the other country features an unregulated financial sector – I find that the
introduction of unconventional monetary policy lowers the incentives to reform
financial structures in the financially less regulated country.
The unconventional monetary policy measures analyzed in this paper represent
instruments which are also part of the ECB’s toolbox. Liquidity facilities have
been one of the most important instruments of the ECB. Since 2008, liquidity
was provided to the banking system elastically and at increasingly long durations
through main and longer-term refinancing operations (MROs and LTROs) (Praet,
2017). Before and at the beginning of the financial crisis, Germany was the main
user of these instruments (Bruegel, 2017). However, when the most significant
three-year LTROs where provided in 2011 and 2012, the composition of country
usage changed completely. Since 2011, the periphery’s share in the usage of liquidity
facilities has increased to more than 70% and has remained at this high level ever
since (see figure 3.1). This implies that liquidity facilities where provided flexibly
according to country-specific needs. The picture is quite different when considering
the ECB’s corporate sector asset purchase program which started in 2016. Direct
lending to non-financial firms is distributed between countries in a fixed manner,
according to a capital key which reflects the market value of eligible corporate
bonds (ECB, 2017). Therefore, as figure 3.2 shows, mainly firms in the economically
largest – and also less troubled – countries have access to central bank credit.
4Lester et al. (2014) and Cho et al. (2015) discuss further model features which can render
volatility welfare-improving. Lester et al. (p. 18 2014) show that the “benefits of greater volatility
are closely linked to the degree of elasticity in factor supplies.” Hence, variable capital utilization
and relatively elastic labor supply, which are both features of my model, might also contribute to
the positive effects of volatility on welfare.
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Figure 3.1: Periphery’s Share in the Usage of the Eurosystem’s Main and Longer-
Term Refinancing Operations 01/2003 - 09/2017; Bruegel (2017)
Figure 3.2: Country Classification of Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP)
Holdings and CSPP-Eligible Bond Universe; ECB (2017)
Given the extensive usage of non-standard measures by central banks around the
world in recent years, there has been a surge in empirical and theoretical literature
trying to analyze the economic effects of different unconventional policy measures.
Employing DSGE models featuring a banking sector with financial frictions, Gertler
and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) and Cu´rdia and Woodford (2011)
have shown that there are substantial gains from expanding central bank credit
during crisis. Yet, as the analyses are based on closed economies, they are not
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well-suited to give advice on how the institutions of a currency union should cope
with a financial crisis. Papers which analyze unconventional monetary policy in
a two-country setting are usually interested in game theoretical issues associated
with two separate monetary authorities interested in their own welfare functions
(see, e.g., Dedola et al., 2013; Nuguer, 2016). The focus of my analysis is different.
I omit game theoretical issues, for in a monetary union, it is reasonable to assume
that a common monetary policy maker adopts a union-wide welfare function. As
long as business cycles between member countries are less than perfectly correlated,
it is, however, of great interest to analyze union-wide versus country-specific
implementation of unconventional monetary policies. To my knowledge, there is
only one paper by Tischbirek (2016) which addresses this kind of question, however,
focuses on the effects of government debt purchases on fiscal policies. He uses a
model which does not feature financial frictions. Further, Auray et al. (2016) use a
version of the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model to analyze unconventional monetary
policies in the Eurozone. However, they do not distinguish between country-specific
and union-wide measures but are rather interested in strategies aimed at different
financial market sectors. Schwanebeck (2017) uses the same structurally asymmetric
two-country version of the Gertler and Karadi (2011) model as Nuguer (2016) (one
country is a net borrower and the other is a net lender) to analyze the effects of
unconventional monetary policy on the wholesale interbank market. However, he
does not conduct a welfare analysis but focuses on positive policy implications.
To the extent of my knowledge, this paper is the first to analyze whether
unconventional monetary policy can and should be used to stabilize country-
specific shocks in a monetary union featuring – potentially heterogeneous – financial
frictions.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the model. Section
3.3 provides the calibration. In section 3.4, I will explain the welfare measure used.
In section 3.5, I present and discuss the results on optimal simple rules in the
baseline setup and in the case where one country features a more stable financial
system than the other one. The final section concludes and gives an outlook.
3.2 Model
I assume that the world consists of two countries with symmetric structures which
belong to a monetary union, each inhabited by a continuum of agents of equal
size. The setup of each country closely resembles the setup of the closed economy
modeled in Gertler and Karadi (2011), i.e., besides a banking system the model
contains nominal (price stickiness) and real (habit formation, variable capital
utilization) rigidities.
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Each country features a financial intermediation sector. The role of intermedi-
aries is to transfer funds between households and intermediate goods producers
who use the loans to finance investment into physical capital. Intermediaries face
an endogenously determined constraint on their leverage ratio, motivated by a
simple agency problem which drives a wedge between saving and borrowing rates.
The two countries feature integrated markets for final goods, capital assets and
deposits. To allow for these multiple interlinkages, I have to abstract from complete
international consumption risk sharing. Allowing the net foreign asset position
to be adjusted via two margins - equity and bond trade - might imply two unit
roots in a first-order approximation of the model (see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe, 2003). Hence, I introduce two stationarity-inducing features, an endogenous
discount factor, which dates back to Uzawa (1968), and a debt-elastic interest rate
yield.
For simplicity only home country equations will be displayed. Foreign variables
will be denoted with an asterisk.
3.2.1 Households
Within each household, there are two member types, workers and bankers. While
the worker supplies work to intermediate goods firms and deposits to banks, the
banker manages a financial intermediary and transfers retained earnings back to
her household when the lifetime of the bank ends. Within the family, there is
perfect consumption risk sharing, which allows to maintain the representative agent
framework. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), it is assumed that a fraction 1 − f of
household members are depositors, while a fraction f are bankers. Between periods
there is a random turnover between the two groups: with probability θb a banker
will stay a banker and with probability 1 − θb she will become a depositor. The
relative proportions are kept fixed. New bankers are provided with some start-up
funds from their respective households.
The lifetime utility of a representative home worker, who draws utility from
consumption, Ct, and disutility from labor, Lt, is given by
Et
∞∑
k=0
Θt+k
(
ln(Ct+k − hCt+k−1)− χ
L1+φt+k
1 + φ
)
,
where parameter h determines the degree of habit formation, φ is the inverse of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and χ determines the weight of disutility of
labor in the utility function. Variable Θt represents the endogenous discount factor
of households chosen to ensure stationarity as explained above.
Households save by depositing funds at domestic and foreign intermediaries
(see 3.2.2 for details). Total deposits held between t− 1 and t, denoted by Dt−1, are
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equivalent to one-period riskless real bonds paying the gross real rate of return Rt−1.
Furthermore, households provide labor to intermediate goods firms and receive the
real wage wt. Hence, the representative home household’s budget constraint in real
terms is given by
Ct +Dt + Tt = Rt−1Dt−1 + wtLt + Υt,
where Υt denotes net profits from the ownership of firms (financial and non-financial)
and Tt denotes lump-sum taxes.
Households have equal preferences for home and foreign final goods.5 Hence,
Ct, the CES composite of consumption, is given by
Ct =
(
0.5
1
ιC
ι−1
ι
H,t + 0.5
1
ιC
ι−1
ι
F,t
) ι
ι−1
,
with ι > 0 and CH,t and CF,t denoting consumption of home and foreign final goods,
respectively. The corresponding consumer price index takes the following form
Pt =
(
0.5P 1−ιH,t + 0.5P
1−ι
F,t
) 1
1−ι , (3.1)
where PH,t denotes the price of the home good in the home country and PF,t denotes
the price of the foreign good in the home country.
Assuming local currency pricing, the law of one price holds, i.e., PH,t = P
∗
H,t
and PF,t = P
∗
F,t. As households preferences are identical in the two countries and
no home bias is assumed, the consumption baskets are equal. Hence, Purchasing
Power Parity holds and the real exchange rate is constant (Pt = P
∗
t ). The terms of
trade are defined as the ratio between the price of exports and the price of imports,
ToTt ≡ PH,tPF,t .
The endogenous discount factor is determined as follows
Θt+1 = Θtβ(CA,t),
Θ0 = 1,
where CA,t is aggregate home consumption. Using aggregate consumption in the
endogenous discount factor ensures that the household does not internalize the effect
of its consumption decision on the discount factor, which simplifies calculations
considerably. As in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) and Devereux and Yetman
5The main results of this paper are robust to changing this assumption, i.e., the results also
hold when household consumption is biased towards home goods. However, the assumption of
equal preferences simplifies the interpretation of results because real exchange fluctuations are
absent.
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(2010) the following functional form of the endogenous discount factor is assumed
β(CA,t) = ωc(1 + CA,t)
−ηc . (3.2)
Parameter ηc drives the elasticity of the discount factor with respect to consumption.
Parameter ωc captures the steady-state savings propensity. Note that the discount
factor decreases in CA,t, i.e., whenever a country has relatively higher consumption
in the present, it discounts future consumption more heavily and, hence, saves less.
The latter implies lower consumption in the future and, therefore, the economy
returns to the initial state.
Hence, the household’s first-order conditions for the optimal choice of labor and
consumption are given by
wt = χ
Lφt
λt
, (3.3)
and
1 = β(CA,t)EtΛt,t+1Rt, (3.4)
with the household’s real stochastic discount factor being defined as
Λt,t+1 ≡ λt+1
λt
, (3.5)
where λt denotes the marginal utility of consumption given by
λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − β(CA,t)h(EtCt+1 − hCt)−1. (3.6)
3.2.2 International Intermediaries
To simplify matters, I implicitly assume that households hold deposits with inter-
national savings banks which – according to the needs in the financial system –
channel the funds to home and foreign banks via international intermediaries. Total
deposits of home households are given by Dt = DH,t +DF,t.
Allowing deposits to freely flow between countries, would induce a unit root.
Therefore, it is assumed that home deposits can only be channeled to foreign
banks by purchasing one-period bonds from international intermediaries. The latter
charge a small interest rate premium on the union-wide nominal interest rate. The
premium depends on the real net foreign bond position of the respective country.
This assumption adds realism to the model and ensures stationarity (see, e.g.,
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003). As in Hjortsoe (2016), I assume
it = i
CB
t Φ(DF,t), (3.7)
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where iCBt is the nominal interest rate set by the union-wide central bank and
it is the country rate. It is assumed that the country-specific rate charged by
international intermediaries is increasing in the deviation of the external household
debt position (real debt is given by −DF,t) from its steady state, i.e., Φ(·)′ < 0 and
Φ(0) = 0. As in Hjortsoe (2016), the following functional form is chosen for the
debt-elastic interest rate premium
Φ(DF,t) = (1− ωdDF,t).
Parameter ωd is the yield sensitivity of debt.
Profits of international intermediaries are distributed to households within the
current account surplus country. Note that rates of return on home deposits and
bonds (equivalent to deposit holdings with foreign banks, DF,t) are equalized due
to arbitrage.
3.2.3 Banks
The setup of the banking sector closely follows Gertler and Karadi (2011) except for
the modeling of the international dimensions. In the model economy, home financial
intermediaries channel funds from households to home and foreign intermediate
goods producers, fulfilling the double role of investment as well as commercial
banks. In addition to obtaining funds from households, banks also raise funds
internally by accumulating retained earnings. The balance sheet of home bank i is
given by
Bi,t = D
B
i,t +Ni,t, (3.8)
where Ni,t denotes intermediary i’s net worth. Deposits at bank i, stemming from
home and foreign households, are denoted by DBi,t = DiH,t + D
∗
iH,t. The asset
portfolio of bank i, Bi,t, consists of home as well as foreign assets which are
combined according to the following CES aggregator6
Bi,t =
(
µ
1
ιb
b (QtSiH,t)
ιb−1
ιb + (1− µb)
1
ιb (Q∗tSiF,t)
ιb−1
ιb
) ιb
ιb−1
. (3.9)
Variable SiH,t (SiF,t) denotes the state-contingent claims on future returns of a unit
of capital used in intermediate goods production in the home (foreign) economy.
6Assuming that the portfolio composition is determined by a CES aggregator allows to solve
the model without using an endogenous portfolio choice method. The latter are associated with
certain drawbacks such as inaccuracies when analyzing structurally asymmetric countries and
at higher orders of approximation (cf. Rabitsch et al., 2015). Therefore, the usage of the CES
function to determine international portfolios has become more and more popular in recent years
(see, e.g., Auray et al., 2016; Poutineau and Vermandel, 2015; Brzoza-Brzezina et al., 2015;
Dra¨ger and Proan˜o, 2018).
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The price of the claim is given by Qt (Q
∗
t ). Parameter µb denotes home bias in
portfolio holdings. Accordingly, the return on the portfolio, RAt , is determined by
the following equation
1
RAt
=
µb( 1
Rk,t
)1−ιb
+ (1− µb)
(
1
R∗k,t
)1−ιb
ιb
ιb−1
, (3.10)
where Rk,t (R
∗
k,t) denotes the state-contingent gross real rate of return of the home
(foreign) capital asset. The banker chooses the optimal portfolio composition by
maximizing expected portfolio returns subject to equation (3.9).7
Intermediary i’s net worth evolves according to the following equation
Ni,t = R
A
t Bi,t−1 −Rt−1DBi,t−1.
Since the banker cannot invest in assets which yield a discounted return smaller
than the cost of borrowing, the following inequality has to be satisfied
Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1(R
A
t+1 −Rt) ≥ 0.
With perfect capital markets the above relation would hold with equality. In the
presence of financial frictions, however, the premium must be positive. It covaries
negatively with output as the intermediary’s inability to obtain funds increases
during bad states of the economy. As long as the banker earns some positive yield
on each unit of money invested, she finds it worthwhile to operate and further
accumulate earnings.
It is assumed that each period a fraction 1-θb of bankers exit the business with
i.i.d. probability and pay out accumulated earnings to their respective households.8
Therefore, a banker maximizes the terminal value of her net worth given by
Vt = max Et
∞∑
k=0
(1− θb)θkbΘt+kΛt,t+k+1Ni,t+k+1.
To motivate the requirement to build up net worth, the following moral hazard
problem is assumed: At the beginning of each period, before the shocks realize and
any other transactions take place, the banker can choose to divert the fraction λb
of available funds back to the household. The cost associated with this fraud is
that the depositors recover the remaining fraction 1 − λb and force the banker into
bankruptcy. Therefore, for households to be willing to deposit funds with the bank,
7Details of the banker’s CES portfolio choice problem and its solutions can be found in the
appendix (section B.1).
8This arrangement precludes bankers from aggregating so much net worth that the incentive
constraint becomes irrelevant for them.
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the following incentive constraint must hold
Vi,t ≥ λbBi,t. (3.11)
To solve the banker’s maximization problem define the objective of the bank
recursively as
Vi,t = max Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1[(1− θb)Ni,t+1 + θbVi,t+1],
and conjecture that the franchise value is linear in assets and net worth
Vi,t = νi,tBi,t + ηi,tNi,t.
The banker’s problem consists in choosing the amount of total assets and
deposits such that terminal net worth is maximized and the incentive constraint
holds. It can be solved using the Lagrange method.9
The solutions for the coefficients are given by
νt = EtΩt,t+1(R
A
t+1 −Rt), and (3.12)
ηt = EtΩt,t+1Rt, (3.13)
where
Ωt,t+1 = β(CA,t)Λt,t+1 [(1− θb) + θb (ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1)] , (3.14)
which can be interpreted as the stochastic discount factor of the banker. It differs
from the household’s stochastic discount factor due to the presence of financial
frictions. Note that the subscript i was dropped because the coefficients exclusively
depend on aggregate variables.
Assuming that the incentive constraint binds,10 it can be expressed in terms of
the coefficients of the value function
Bt =
ηt
λb − νtNt = φtNt, (3.15)
where φt is the ratio of intermediated assets to net worth, which can be referred to
as the leverage ratio. Note that it is determined endogenously in this model.
9The solution to the banks’ problem is analogous to the one of the model presented in chapter
2. Detailed derivations can be found in section A.1 of the appendix to chapter 2.
10Parameters and steady-state values are chosen such that the incentive constraint binds in the
steady state. Holding shocks small enough guarantees that the incentive constraint also binds in
a stochastic environment.
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Finally, the law of motion for aggregate net worth can be derived as
Nt = Nn,t +Ne,tΞN,t (3.16)
Ne,t = θb
[
(RAt −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1 (3.17)
Nn,t = ωbBt−1, (3.18)
where Ne,t denotes existing bankers’ net worth, Nn,t denotes new bankers’ net worth
and ωb is the fraction of assets given to new bankers by households. Variable ΞN,t
denotes an exogenous disturbance to the net worth of existing bankers.
3.2.4 Intermediate Goods Firms
Intermediate goods firms produce an intermediate good which is sold to final goods
producers in the same country at the real price Pm,t for use in the production
of the final good. The market for intermediate goods is assumed to be perfectly
competitive. open The Cobb-Douglas production function of the representative
intermediate goods firm is given by
Ym,t = At(UtΨtKt−1)αL1−αt , (3.19)
where Ym,t denotes intermediary output, At exogenous technology and Ut the
utilization rate of capital. Parameter α denotes the output elasticity of capital.
Labor Lt is provided by households in the same country only. Capital Kt−1 was
bought from capital goods producers in the same country in the previous period at
price Qt−1. To finance capital purchases, the firm issues state-contingent securities
to obtain funds from home and foreign intermediaries at the same price. Each
period, after being productive, the firm has to pay back capital returns on the
securities issued in the previous period. As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume
that there exists a shock to the quality of capital, denoted by Ψt, to provide a
source for exogenous variations in the price of capital. It can be interpreted as
the sudden realization that much of the capital installed is of lower quality than
previously thought. As the capital stock is equal to the capital claims issued to
banks, banks’ balance sheets contract in response to a negative capital quality
shock. The law of motion for capital is given by
Kt = It + (1− δ(Ut))ΨtKt−1, (3.20)
where It is aggregate investment and δ(Ut) denotes physical depreciation, where
δ′(Ut) > 0 and δ′′(Ut) > 0.
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The first-order conditions of the intermediate goods producer’s profit maximiza-
tion problem are, therefore, given by11
Rk,t+1 =
αPm,t+1Ym,t+1
Kt
+ (Qt+1 − δ(Ut+1))Ψt+1
Qt
, (3.21)
wt = (1− α)Pm,tYm,t
Lt
, (3.22)
and
δ′(Ut)ΨtKt−1 = Pm,tα
Ym,t
Ut
. (3.23)
The firm earns zero profits state-by-state, hence, it simply pays out the ex post
return to capital Rk,t to the financial intermediary.
3.2.5 Capital Goods Firms
Competitive capital goods firms produce capital only for the domestic market using
national final output as input facing investment adjustment costs (in consumption
units). I also follow the approach used by Gertler and Karadi (2011) and assume
that adjustment costs are on net investment so that the capital utilization decision
is independent of the market price of capital. Their functional form is given by
f
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
)
=
ηI
2
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
− 1
)2
, (3.24)
with ηI > 0, denoting the inverse elasticity of investment with respect to price
of capital, I denoting steady-state investment and net investment being defined
as In,t ≡ It − δ(Ut)ΨtKt−1. The capital goods producer chooses It to maximize
lifetime profits given by
Et
∞∑
k=0
ΘkΛt,t+k {Qt+kIt+k − [1 + f (·)] It+k} .
From the first order conditions, the real price of one unit of capital is obtained
Qt = 1− f(·) + In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
f ′(·)− Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1
(
In,t+1 + I
In,t + I
)2
f ′(·). (3.25)
Due to flow investment costs, capital goods firms can earn profits outside the steady
state. These profits are distributed lump-sum to the households.
11As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that the replacement price of depreciated capital is
unity. Therefore, the value of the capital stock which is left over is given by (Qt+1−δ(Ut+1))Ψt+1Kt.
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3.2.6 Final Goods Firms
Final output produced by home firms and purchased by consumers at home and
abroad, Yt, is assumed to be a CES composite of mass unity of differentiated final
products
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(f)
−1
 df
] 
−1
,
with 0 < . Yt(f) denotes output by retailer f . The corresponding home producer
price index is given by
PH,t =
[∫ 1
0
PH,t(f)
1−df
] 1
1−
.
Given that consumers allocate consumption expenditures optimally between va-
rieties, home final goods firm f faces the following demand by home and foreign
consumers12
Yt(f) =
(
PH,t(f)
PH,t
)−
Yt,
i.e., its share in total home final goods production, Yt, depends on its relative price.
It is assumed that each unit of final output is assembled costlessly from one unit
of intermediate output. Real marginal cost is therefore given by the intermediate
output price Pm,t. It is further assumed that firms face a positive probability, θ,
each period that they a are not able to reset their price (see Calvo, 1983). If not
able to reset its price, a firm can partly index its price to the lagged rate of inflation.
Hence, the optimal price of a representative home firm, P˜H,t is given by
P˜H,t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 θ
kΘkλt+kΠ

H,t,t+kΠ
−θpi
H,t−1,t+k−1Yt+kPm,t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 θ
kΘkλt+kΠ
−1
H,t,t+kΠ
(1−)θpi
H,t−1,t+k−1Yt+kpH,t+k
PH,t, (3.26)
where ΠH,t ≡ PH,tPH,t−1 denotes home producer price inflation between t − 1 and t,
pH,t ≡ PH,tPt is the relative price of home goods and θpi denotes the degree of price
indexation. The dynamics of the home price index are given by
PH,t =
(
θΠ
θpi(1−)
H,t−1 P
1−
H,t−1 + (1− θ)P˜ 1−H,t
) 1
1−
. (3.27)
3.2.7 Interest Rate Policy
Interest rate policy is specified by a standard Taylor rule. It is assumed that the
common central bank reacts to variations in the union-wide output gap and the
consumer price index (CPI). The union-wide output gap is determined as a weighted
12Under the assumption of local currency pricing (which preserves the Law of one Price), a
distinction between home and foreign demand is not necessary.
3.2. MODEL 41
average of the country-specific output gaps. Given that Purchasing Power Parity
holds, consumer price inflation is the same among both countries, i.e., Πt = Π
∗
t ,
where Πt =
Pt
Pt−1
denotes consumer price inflation between periods t− 1 and t. CPI
targeting is chosen, because it represents a better description of actual Taylor rules
used in central banks following inflation targeting strategies (Devereux et al., 2014,
p. 937). The particular Taylor rule of the central bank is given by
iCBt =
(
βΠγpit yˆ
0.5γy
t yˆ
∗0.5γy
t
)1−ρi (
iCBt−1
)ρi
εM,t, (3.28)
where β is the steady-state discount factor and yˆt (yˆ
∗
t ) denotes the domestic (foreign)
output gap, defined as the difference between flexible price output and sticky price
output. The output gap is approximated by the inverse of the markup gap.13 The
monetary disturbance is denoted by εM,t.
The Fisher equation establishes the link between the country-specific nominal
and real interest rates, i.e.,
it = RtEtΠt+1, (3.29)
where the link between the country-specific nominal rate, it, and the union-wide
policy rate, iCBt , is given by equation (3.7).
Note that I do not assume that conventional monetary policy acts to accommo-
date unconventional policy. Cahn et al. (2014) model an accommodating interest
rate policy and find that, in this case, the effects of unconventional policy are much
larger.
3.2.8 Unconventional Policies
In this paper, I analyze the impact of two kinds of unconventional monetary policy,
in particular, liquidity facilities and private sector credit purchases. Both types of
policies are modeled using simple rules.
Liquidity Facilities
In the European Union, since the end of 2008, liquidity facilities are conducted
under the fixed rate full allotment tender procedure, i.e., the ECB sets the interest
rate and elastically supplies any amount of liquidity financial institutions ask for.
The model cannot directly replicate this policy feature as the central bank in the
model chooses the quantity of funds by following a feedback rule. However, rule-
based liquidity injections capture the endogeneity of the balance sheet expansion to
some extent as they imply that the supply of central bank credit reacts elastically
to prevailing market conditions (Cahn et al., 2014).
13In the given setup, the markup is given by
pH,t
Pm,t
, where pH,t ≡ PH,tPt .
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The central bank can lend funds, denoted by Mt, directly to banks at rate Rm,t.
As proposed by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011), it is assumed that the central bank
has superior enforcement possibilities compared to households, hence, only the
fraction λb(1−λm) with 0 < λm < 1 of central bank assets can be diverted.14 Given
these assumptions, a home intermediary’s balance sheet takes the following form
Bi,t = D
B
i,t +Ni,t +Mi,t. (3.30)
The equation for the evolution of intermediary i’s net worth needs to be replaced
by the following equation
Ni,t = R
A
t Bi,t−1 −Rt−1DBi,t−1 −Rm,t−1Mi,t−1.
The incentive constraint (formerly defined by equation (3.11)) is now given by
Vi,t ≥ λb(Bi,t − λmMi,t). (3.31)
Taking into account the modified balance sheet and incentive constraint, the net
cost of an extra unit of liquidity facilities is given by
ηm,t = EtΩt,t+1(Rm,t −Rt). (3.32)
From the first order conditions of the modified bank’s problem, it can be further
derived that
ηm,t = λmνt, (3.33)
which ties down Rm,t. The law of motion for existing banks’ net worth (formerly
defined by equation (3.17)) changes to
Ne,t = θb
[
(RAt −Rt−1)
φt−1
1− λmΦm,t−1 − (R
m
t−1 −Rt−1)
φt−1Φm,t−1
1− λmΦm,t−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1,
(3.34)
where Φm,t denotes the fraction of home bank assets intermediated by the central
bank, i.e.,
Mt = Φm,tBt. (3.35)
As already discussed, I use a rule-based approach to model the provision of
liquidity facilities. The fractions of intermediated assets in the home and foreign
14If the fraction of divertable assets would be the same for central bank funds as for household
deposits, the extra credit would not expand the supply of liquidity in the banking market but
simply supplant it.
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economy, Φm,t and Φ
∗
m,t, respectively, are determined by simple rules. In particular,
I distinguish between union-wide versus country-specific rules and credit spread
(rule 1) versus credit growth (rule 2) rules. If a union-wide rule is chosen, the
central bank adjusts Φm,t = Φ
∗
m,t in reaction to union-wide averages, whereas, when
a country-specific rule is chosen, it holds that Φm,t 6= Φ∗m,t, whenever the economy
is not in the deterministic steady state.15 Note that an increase in the credit spread
and a decrease in credit growth indicate a tightening of financial conditions caused
by an adverse shock. Hence, the fractions of intermediated assets, Φm,t and Φ
∗
m,t,
are either directly proportional to the deviation of the external finance spread16
from its steady-state value (credit spread rule) or inversely proportional to credit
growth (credit growth rule).
Hence, the union-wide rule is either given by
Φm,t = κm
[
0.5
(
ln
(
Rk,t
Rt
)
+ ln
(
R∗k,t
R∗t
))
− ln
(
Rk
R
)]
(3.36)
or
Φm,t = −κm ln
[
0.5(QtKt +Q
∗
tK
∗
t )
0.5(Qt−1Kt−1 +Q∗t−1K
∗
t−1)
]
. (3.37)
The country-specific rules are either given by
Φm,t = κm
[
ln
(
Rk,t
Rt
)
− ln
(
Rk
R
)]
, (3.38)
Φ∗m,t = κm
[
ln
(
R∗k,t
R∗t
)
− ln
(
Rk
R
)]
, (3.39)
or
Φm,t = −κm ln
[
QtKt
Qt−1Kt−1
]
, (3.40)
Φ∗m,t = −κm ln
[
Q∗tK
∗
t
Q∗t−1K
∗
t−1
]
. (3.41)
15I only consider uncorrelated country-specific shocks. If shocks were perfectly correlated
between the two economies, it would also hold in the presence of shocks that Φm,t = Φ
∗
m,t.
16Note that I use the same definition of the external finance premium as Gertler and Karadi
(2011), i.e., the difference between financing costs of firms and the deposit rate. In their model,
this spread coincides with the spread relevant for banks. With banking market integration, I
could alternatively use lnRAt+1 − lnRt, reflecting more closely the conditions in the banking
sector. Although I do not expect results to differ much, I plan to include such an analysis into
the robustness checks.
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Corporate Sector Credit Policy
The second type of unconventional monetary policy is the direct provision of
non-financial private sector credit by the central bank (see also, e.g., Gertler and
Karadi, 2011; Dedola et al., 2013). I assume that the central bank intermediates
fraction Φf,t of overall funding needs in the home economy, i.e.,
Ft = Φf,tQtKt, (3.42)
where Ft denotes overall private sector asset purchases by the central bank in the
home economy. Hence, the capital market clearing condition, equation (3.52), which
will be provided in the next section, has to account for the fraction of publicly
intermediated assets.
As before, I distinguish between union-wide versus country-specific and credit
spread (rule 1) versus credit growth (rule 2) rules. And it also holds that whenever
the central bank choses a union-wide rule, the same fraction of private sector assets
is provided in each country, i.e., Φf,t = Φ
∗
f,t.
Therefore, the union-wide rule is either given by
Φf,t = κf
[
0.5
(
ln
(
Rk,t
Rt
)
+ ln
(
R∗k,t
R∗t
))
− ln
(
Rk
R
)]
(3.43)
or by
Φf,t = −κf ln
(
0.5(QtKt +Q
∗
tK
∗
t )
0.5(Qt−1Kt−1 +Q∗t−1K
∗
t−1)
)
. (3.44)
The country-specific rules are either given by
Φf,t = κf
[
ln
(
Rk,t
Rt
)
− ln
(
Rk
R
)]
, (3.45)
Φ∗f,t = κf
[
ln
(
R∗k,t
R∗t
)
− ln
(
Rk
R
)]
, (3.46)
or by
Φf,t = −κf ln
(
QtKt
Qt−1Kt−1
)
, (3.47)
Φ∗f,t = −κf ln
(
Q∗tK
∗
t
Q∗t−1K
∗
t−1
)
. (3.48)
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Public Intermediation Costs and Government Budget Constraint
I assume that central bank intermediation is costly. These costs could capture
efficiency costs but also the risk of credit default whose actual occurrence is ruled
out in this kind of model. I follow Gertler et al. (2012) and Dedola et al. (2013)
in assuming quadratic intermediation costs. This kind of modeling reflects the
more realistic scenario where costs are higher whenever the central bank has a long
position in corporate assets or bank credit (Gertler et al., 2012). The cost functions
are given by
Γm,t = τ1(Mt +M
∗
t ) + τ2(M
2
t +M
∗2
t ), (3.49)
Γf,t = τ1(Ft + F
∗
t ) + τ2(F
2
t + F
∗2
t ), (3.50)
where Γm,t and Γf,t denote the total costs of central bank intervention and τ1 and
τ2 reflect the sensitivity of the costs with respect to the amount of central bank
credit provided.
Central bank credit to financial and non-financial firms is financed by the
issuance of government debt which is a perfect substitute for household deposits.
I assume that in each country the amount of central bank credit is equal to the
issuance of government debt. Thereby, the aggregate resource constraint is not
affected by unconventional monetary policy. Furthermore, I assume that costs are
equally split between the two countries. Hence, the home government flow budget
constraint takes the following form
0.5(Γm,t + Γf,t) +Mt + Ft = Tt + (Rm,t−1 −Rt−1)Mt−1 + (Rk,t −Rt−1)Ft−1.
(3.51)
3.2.9 Market Clearing and Further Equilibrium Condi-
tions
The capital market clearing condition states that in each country, the current value
of total installed capital has to be equal to the total value of state-contingent claims
on future returns of capital. If the central bank provides corporate sector credit,
the fraction of funds intermediated by the central bank, Φf,t, has to be deducted
(1− Φf,t)QtKt = Qt(SH,t + S∗H,t). (3.52)
Home final goods market clearing is given by
Yt = CH,t + C
∗
H,t +
Pt
PH,t
[It + f
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
)
(In,t + I)]. (3.53)
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The home aggregate resource constraint is derived from aggregation of home
households’ budget constraints, considering profits from the ownership of non-
financial firms, profits of international intermediaries, the government flow budget
constraint, retained earnings from exiting bankers and the transfer to new bankers
PH,t
Pt
Yt +Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1R
∗
k,t −Qt−1S∗H,t−1Rk,t +DF,t−1
it−1
Πt
+ ΥIFIt
= Ct +DF,t + [It + f
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
)
(In,t + I)]
+Q∗tSF,t −QtS∗H,t + 0.5(Γm,t + Γf,t), (3.54)
where ΥIFIt = −
(
1
Φ(−DF,t) − 1
)
DF,t
iCBt
denotes international intermediaries’ profits.17
Bonds are in zero net supply, i.e.,
DF,t = −D∗H,t,
where D∗H,t denotes foreign households’ deposits in home banks or, more specifically,
foreign international bond holdings invested in home banks.
Last but not least, the relationship between final goods production and inter-
mediate goods production characterizes the equilibrium
Ym,t = Yt∆p,t, (3.55)
with ∆p,t denoting the price dispersion which arises in a model with a two-stage
production process with intermediate and final good producers and sticky prices a`
la Calvo. It can be written in terms of producer price inflation
∆p,t = θ∆p,t−1ΠH,tΠ
−θpi
H,t−1 + (1− θ)
(
1− θΠ−1H,t Πθpi(1−)H,t−1
1− θ
) 
−1
. (3.56)
The full set of equilibrium equations of the model can be found in the appendix
(section B.2).
3.3 Calibration
Table 3.1 reports the baseline calibration and its sources. The time unit is one
quarter.
The values for the habit formation parameter, h, the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply, φ−1, the steady-state depreciation rate, δ(U), the elasticity of marginal
depreciation with respect to the utilization rate, ζ, the inverse elasticity of net
17As in Hjortsoe (2016), I assume that international intermediaries’ profits are redistributed in
a lump-sum fashion to households in the current account surplus country.
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investment to the price of capital, ηI and the Calvo parameter, θ, are taken from
Gertler and Karadi (2011). They report to base most of them on estimates from
Primiceri et al. (2006).
Parameter ηc in the endogenous discount factor was taken from Devereux and
Sutherland (2009). They choose it to be small, to keep the effects of this purely
technical feature on the results of the model negligible. The same is true for ωd, the
yield sensitivity to debt, which is calibrated as in Hjortsoe (2016). Given ηc = 0.01
and the steady-state value of consumption, parameter ωc was chosen as to guarantee
an annual steady-state interest rate of 4%, i.e., a steady-state value of β(CA) of
0.99.
Parameter b, which appears in the equation for variable capital utilization (see
equation (B.35) in the appendix), was chosen such that the steady-state capital
utilization rate is equal to one. Given b, parameter δu was chosen as to guarantee a
steady-state depreciation rate of 0.025.
The value chosen for the trade elasticity between home and foreign goods is
in line with the values de Walque et al. (2006) estimated for the European Union.
Home bias in asset holdings, µb, and the elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign assets, ιb, were taken from Poutineau and Vermandel (2015) who estimated
them based on Eurozone data. Note that the value of ιb determines the degree of
synchronization between home and foreign asset returns.
The values of the parameters of the banking system, λb, θb and ωb are taken
from Gertler and Karadi (2011). They choose these values to hit three targets: a
steady-state interest rate spread of 100 basis points, a steady-state leverage ratio
of four and an average lifetime of a bank of 10 years.
The coefficients of the Taylor rule, γy and γpi, were also taken from Gertler and
Karadi (2011). Parameter λm was chosen to yield a divertability of government
assets of approximately 0.2 (= λb(1 − λM)), which is, admittedly, an arbitrary
value. The intermediation cost parameters, τ1 and τ2, are taken from Gertler et al.
(2012).18 The feedback coefficients of the unconventional monetary policy rules will
be chosen optimally.
The three exogenous variables At, Ψt and ΞN,t are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes. Persistency and standard deviation of the technology shock are taken
from Gertler and Karadi (2011). The persistency of the net wealth shock is set to
0.66 which is equal to the persistency of the capital quality shock. Note that the
capital quality shock as well as the net wealth shock directly affect stock variables
and, hence, feature a high endogenous persistency. The size of the capital quality
shock is set equal to the size of the other shocks.
18As there is no information on the cost of central bank credit policy, however, the modeling of
these costs directly affects the welfare results, robustness checks were conducted. I found that the
main result is not qualitatively affected by choosing considerably higher values of τ1 and τ2. The
corresponding welfare tables can be found in section B.4 of the appendix.
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Parameter Description Value Source
Households
h habit formation parameter 0.815 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
χ utility weight of labor 2.592
φ inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ηc parameter from discount factor 0.010 Devereux and Sutherland
(2009)
ωc parameter capturing steady-state
savings propensity
0.996
ωd yield sensitivity to debt 0.010 Hjortsoe (2016)
Capital producing firms
ηI inverse elasticity of investment
with respect to price of capital
1.728 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Intermediate goods firms
α output elasticity of capital 0.330 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ(U) steady-state depreciation rate 0.025 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ζ elasticity of marginal depreciation
with respect to utilization rate
7.200 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
b parameter from variable capital
utilization
0.038
δu parameter from variable capital
utilization
0.020
Final goods firms
θ probability of keeping prices fixed 0.779 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
θpi degree of price indexation 0.241 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
 elasticity of substitution between
varieties
4.167 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ι elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign goods
4.000 de Walque et al. (2006)
Financial intermediaries
λb fraction of divertable assets 0.381 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ωb transfer to entering banks 0.002 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
θb quarterly survival rate of banks 0.972 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ιb elasticity of substitution between
home and foreign assets
2.020 Poutineau and Vermandel
(2015)
µb steady-state home bias in asset
holdings
0.910 Poutineau and Vermandel
(2015)
Central bank
γy feedback coefficient on output gap 0.125 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
γpi feedback coefficient on inflation 1.500 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρi interest rate smoothing coefficient 0.800 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
λm parameter to determine divertabil-
ity of central bank funds
0.500
κm feedback coefficient from liquidity
facilities rule
-
κf feedback coefficient from credit
policy rule
-
τ1 CB intermediation cost parameter 0.000125 Gertler et al. (2012)
τ2 CB intermediation cost parameter 0.001200 Gertler et al. (2012)
Exogenous processes
ρψ persistence of capital quality
shock
0.66 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρA persistence of technology shock 0.95 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρN persistence of net wealth shock 0.66
σψ, σN ,
σA, σM standard deviation of shocks 0.01
Table 3.1: Parameters
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3.4 Welfare Measure
Welfare is evaluated by first computing the conditional expected lifetime utility of
the representative household under each financial market setting, as proposed by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2004). The advantage of using conditional welfare is that
it takes into account the transition to a particular, regime specific, stochastic steady
state.19 In the upcoming analyses, all regimes are associated with different stochastic
steady states. Welfare is conditioned on the initial state being the deterministic
steady state, which is the same in all scenarios. Steady state welfare is given by
W =
U(C,L)
1− β(C) =
ln((1− h)C)− χL1+φ
1+φ
1− ωc(1 + C)−ηc
.
The conditional expectation of lifetime utility as of time 0 of a particular regime is
denoted as
W0 = E0
∞∑
k=0
β(CA,t+k)
(
ln(Ct+k − hCt+k−1)− χ
L1+φt+k
1 + φ
)
.
The benefit or loss of a particular policy regime is calculated as the permanent
change in steady-state consumption, necessary to make agents in the non-stochastic
steady state as well off as those in the stochastic economy. I define the necessary
permanent change in steady-state consumption as g. A positive value of g means
that agents in the stochastic setting are better off, whereas a negative value implies
that agents in the non-stochastic setting have a higher welfare. The particular value
for g is found by solving the following equation:
W0 =
ln((1 + g)(1− h)C)− χL1+φ
1+φ
1− ωc(1 + (1 + g)C)−ηc
.
Conditional welfare is calculated with Dynare. Following, e.g., Gertler and Karadi
(2011), I write welfare recursively as
Wt = U(Ct, Lt) + β(CA,t)EtWt+1,
into the model block and take a second-order approximation of the whole model.
From the output I take the uncertainty correction of variable Wt and add it to the
deterministic steady state.20
19I define the stochastic steady state as the point in the state space where agents decide to stay
in the absence of shocks, but taking into account the distribution of future shocks (cf. Juillard
and Kamenik, 2005).
20This procedure is described in the Dynare Forum (see Pfeiffer, 2016).
50 CHAPTER 3. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY
For each type of policy – liquidity facilities and credit policy, credit spread and
credit growth rule, union-wide and country-specific rule – I search for the optimal
rule by searching numerically for the value of κm or κf which yields the highest
conditional welfare. I restrict the values of the reaction coefficients to lay in the
interval of [0, 330]. Gertler and Karadi (2011) call a rule with κf = 100 “aggressive
policy”, hence, parameter values which lay even above 100 can be seen as very
unrealistic. However, this paper is just a first step towards a deeper analysis of
unconventional monetary policy in a monetary union and also a wide arrange of
rules is analyzed, therefore, on purpose, the interval was chosen to be very wide as
well.
3.5 Results
In this section, I first present and discuss the welfare implications of the different
types of unconventional monetary policy introduced in section 3.2.8, from the
viewpoint of a structurally symmetric union. In oder to better understand what
drives these results, I conduct further model analyses, which are presented in
subsection 3.5.2. In particular, I discuss the impulse responses for the home and
foreign economy under different unconventional monetary policies and I analyze
the sensitivity of my results to varying certain model features which are responsible
for the cross-country correlations of the indicator variables. In the last subsection,
I turn to a monetary union, in which one country has already implemented a coun-
tercyclical capital buffer and analyze whether the introduction of unconventional
monetary policy distorts the incentives to introduce the same macroprudential
regulation in the other country.
3.5.1 Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup
Table 3.2 displays the results for the different policy regimes. First, it should be
noted, that all types of policies analyzed here can be welfare-improving compared
to the case of no unconventional policy (relative gain is always positive). However,
this is not a general result but depends, most importantly, on the presence and
calibration of specific shocks in the model, the calibration of λm and the assumptions
regarding the intervention costs.21
Furthermore, it can be seen that in all cases, credit policy yields higher welfare
than the provision of liquidity facilities. The reason is that in the case of credit
policy, the central bank directly provides credit to the corporate sector, while in
the case of liquidity facilities, the funds provided by the central bank are channeled
21As the robustness analysis in section B.4 of the appendix shows, even for very high intervention
cost parameters (τ1 = 0.000625 and τ2 = 0.0062) most policies are still welfare-improving.
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κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -3.69 - 0.70 5.609 1.524 0.702 0.0606 0.331 0.0803
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 59 -3.22 0.47 0.66 5.646 1.512 0.704 0.0541 0.332 0.0485
LF, un. 73 -3.15 0.53 0.64 5.653 1.504 0.705 0.0538 0.332 0.0470
CCP, cou. 182 -2.23 1.46 0.67 5.667 1.258 0.705 0.0483 0.332 0.0367
CCP, un. 231 -2.09 1.59 0.61 5.674 1.170 0.706 0.0490 0.332 0.0358
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 63 2.50 6.19 0.68 5.973 1.297 0.713 0.0525 0.332 0.0562
LF, un. 69 2.28 5.97 0.66 5.951 1.308 0.713 0.0526 0.333 0.0543
CCP, cou. 132 4.17 7.85 0.74 6.077 1.211 0.717 0.0454 0.334 0.0567
CCP, un. 132 3.78 7.46 0.64 6.047 1.229 0.717 0.0476 0.334 0.0546
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table 3.2: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup
through the private financial intermediation sector which is subject to financial
frictions.22 This can also explain, why it is optimal to conduct credit policy much
more aggressively than the provision of liquidity facilities (κf > κm for each rule).
23
A further result is, that credit growth rules yield higher welfare than credit
spread rules. As the positive g implies, when living in an environment in which
the central bank conducts unconventional policies following credit spread rules, a
household even prefers a stochastic over a deterministic environment.24 Assumably,
the reason is that credit growth is more closely related to welfare-relevant, i.e., real
variables than the credit spread. Moreover, the credit spread should be reflected in
credit growth while credit growth contains additional information about the state
of the (real) economy.
22Rewriting the banking sector’s balance sheet in the presence of liquidity facilities as
Bt = φtNt + λmMt,
it is straightforward to see that of each unit of central bank funds provided, only λm < 1 are
turned into credit.
23If one is interested in a direct welfare comparison between these two types of measures, it
might be recommendable to set intervention costs higher for corporate credit policy, given that
corporate asset purchases presumably require a higher amount of monitoring activities by the
central bank.
24As discussed in the introduction to this chapter, in this type of model, a certain degree
of volatility can be welfare-improving as it interacts with the financial friction to stimulate
precautionary behavior, which, generally, results in a higher stochastic steady state capital stock.
The latter permits higher consumption in the stochastic steady state.
52 CHAPTER 3. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY
The most interesting finding is that whenever the central bank uses a credit
spread rule, welfare is higher when the central bank reacts to union-wide averages
than when it reacts to country-specific indicators. The opposite holds when the
central bank relies on a credit growth rule. In this case, country-specific rules are
better suited to address country-specific disturbances. In the next section, I will
provide some additional analyses in order to find an explanation for this result.
Table 3.2 also reports consumption risk-sharing between the two countries, the
stochastic steady-state values of capital (K), bankers’ net worth (N), consumption
(C) and labor (L)25 and consumption and labor volatility. It is interesting to see
that the welfare results are not – or only marginally – driven by consumption risk-
sharing. Although welfare is lowest in the case without unconventional monetary
policy, international risk-sharing ranks second among all regimes. For each rule
and policy, – quite plausibly – risk-sharing is higher when the policy maker reacts
to country-specific indicators, however, as has been discussed before, welfare is not
necessarily higher for country-specific policy. It should further be noted, that welfare
is positively related to the stochastic steady-state capital stock. On the other hand,
in most cases, welfare is higher when banking net worth is lower. Taken together,
these two findings reflect that unconventional policy is successful in reducing
financial frictions which allows banks to hold less net worth, freeing resources which
can be shifted towards the buildup of a higher capital stock. Labor slightly increases
with a higher capital stock, due to the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production
technology. A higher capital stock allows higher consumption in the stochastic
steady state which can partly explain welfare differences. However, the table also
shows that – up to three digits – stochastic steady-state consumption does not
differ between the country-specific and the union-wide conduct of a particular
unconventional policy rules. Consumption volatility is generally higher for union-
wide rules, except if the central bank provides liquidity facilities in reaction to the
credit spread.
3.5.2 Understanding the Results
As it is well know, welfare results are – to a large extent – driven by the underlying
sources of risk. Therefore, when trying to understand the results, it is advisable
to look at the optimal simple rules in environments featuring only one shock at
a time. Tables B.1 to B.4 in appendix B contain the respective coefficients and
welfare results. It can be easily seen that the capital quality shock drives the main
results. This shock is quite powerful and enters the model in different ways. First,
capital quality shocks perfectly resemble technology shocks with respect to their
25The stochastic steady state is computed by simulating the model forward without shocks using
the policy functions obtained from a second-order approximation of the model. This procedure is
explained in the Dynare Forum (see Pfeiffer, 2018).
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direct impact on output by hitting the production function. Second, they have a
direct effect on the capital accumulation process, which brings about additional
persistency. Third, they directly hit banks’ balance sheets, by changing the value of
assets. Due to their large impact on the model, it is not surprising that they have
an important effect on the welfare results. When only technology shocks are present,
households are mostly indifferent between country-specific and union-wide rules.
Furthermore, in such a world, unconventional measures only have a small impact
on welfare. These findings are not surprising, as unconventional monetary policy
targets the financial sector, which, in the case of technology shocks, only causes “a
modest amplification of the decline in output” (Gertler and Karadi, 2011, p. 26).
If households were to exist in a world with only net wealth shocks, i.e., purely
financial shocks, they would unambiguously prefer rules based upon country-specific
indicators. There are sizeable gains from unconventional monetary policy, even with
small optimal coefficients. Credit spread rules score higher than credit growth rules,
which implies that the credit spread might be a better indicator of the needs of the
financial system than credit growth. In a world with only monetary policy shocks,
by construction, households are completely indifferent between country-specific and
union-wide rules, as these shocks are not country-specific.
As capital quality shocks were found to drive the main result, it seems natural
to have a closer look at the economies’ direct response to capital quality shocks.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the impulse responses to an adverse 1% capital quality
shock in the home economy. While the blue line portrays the case without central
bank credit policy, the red line portrays the case with country-specific credit policy
and the black dashed line displays the case with union-wide credit policy. In the
setup underlying figure 3.3 it is assumed that the central bank reacts to the credit
spread whereas the impulse responses displayed in figure 3.4 are based on the
assumption that the central bank reacts to credit growth.
In general, credit policy significantly moderates the contraction in the economy
hit by the shock. By taking over some of the lending activities of the troubled
banking sector, the central bank succeeds in dampening the rise in the credit
spread and the drop in asset prices. This, in turn, dampens the decline in banks’
lending activities. In the absence of central bank credit policy, the foreign economy
experiences a decline in output which is essentially driven by the deterioration
of foreign banks’ balance sheets which are exposed to home assets. As explained
in chapter 2, given financial market integration, the home capital quality shock
directly hits foreign banks’ balance sheets by destroying part of the asset portfolio.
Credit policy by the central bank can completely eliminate the adverse effect on
foreign output (and other real and financial variables) by effectively combatting
the balance sheet recession in the foreign economy.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Capital Quality Shock under a
Credit Spread Rule (Rule 1)
Recall that in the all-shocks environment as well as in the environment only
featuring capital quality shocks, union-wide policies yield higher welfare in the case
of credit spread rules (figure 3.3), whereas country-specific policies yield higher
welfare in the case of credit growth rules (figure 3.4). In order to understand
the impulse responses, it is important to remember that when the central banks
adheres to a union-wide rule it reacts to union-wide averages and intermediates
the same share of funds in both countries. On the other hand, when it follows
country-specific rules, the shares of funds provided in each country are chosen
based on country-specific needs. Therefore, by construction, in the economy hit by
a shock, country-specific policy leads to more stabilization than union-wide policy,
while the opposite is true in the economy not hit by the shock.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Capital Quality Shock under a
Credit Growth Rule (Rule 2)
The figures clearly show that the differences between country-specific and union-
wide policies are much smaller for credit spread rules (figure 3.3) than for credit
growth rules (figure 3.4). This holds even though, in the latter case, the optimal
coefficients are much more alike (κf = 139 and κf = 135). When the central bank
follows a credit spread rule (figure 3.3), the stabilization provided to the home
economy is very similar, regardless of whether the corporate credit purchases are
conducted in a union-wide or a country-specific manner. In the foreign economy, per
construction, union-wide policy leads to more stabilization than country-specific
policy in both figures. However, for credit growth rules (figure 3.4) the differences
between union-wide and country-specific policy are much more pronounced. In
figure 3.4, we can even observe “overstabilization” for union-wide rules: Foreign
investment, net worth and capital prices are pushed into the opposite direction
when the monetary authority relies on union-wide as opposed to country-specific
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indicators. These observations are also reflected in the consumption volatilities
reported in table B.1 in the appendix. For corporate credit policy conducted
according to a credit spread rule, consumption volatility is lower when the central
bank reacts to union-wide indicators as opposed to country-specific indicators
(0.0335 versus 0.0342). For corporate credit policy conducted according to a credit
growth rule, consumption volatility is lower when the central bank relies on country-
specific indicators as opposed to union-wide indicators (0.0270 versus 0.0294). An
explanation for these results is that – at least in the case of capital quality shocks –
credit spreads are much more correlated across countries than credit growth.
As the cross-country correlations of the indicators of the unconventional
monetary policy rules seem to be an important driver of the findings of the
impulse response analyses, it seems worthwhile to conduct robustness checks
with respect to some of the determinants of the cross-country correlation of the
indicator variables. In particular, I analyze the two extreme cases where banks
do not provide credit to foreign firms and, on the other extreme, where banks
hold a fully diversified portfolio (µb = 0.5). Tables B.5 and B.6 in the appendix
show the optimal coefficients and welfare results for the different rules in the two
extreme cases. Table B.5 shows that with domestic credit provision, the result that
credit policy following a credit spread rule yields higher welfare when reacting to
union-wide indicators still holds. In the case of fully diversified banks (see table
B.6), however, it does not hold any more. Now, union-wide rules yield higher
welfare, when the central bank resorts to credit growth as an indicator variable.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4, below, support the view that this is again the result of the
underlying cross-country correlations: In the baseline model (µb = 0.91) and the
model with domestic credit provision, the correlation between home and foreign
credit spreads is higher than the correlation between home and foreign credit
growth. In the model with fully diversified bank portfolios, the ranking is turned
around. This result holds for an environment with all shocks, but is even more
pronounced when only taking into account capital quality shocks.
Correlation Baseline Domestic credit Full diversification
between µb = 0.91 µb = 0.5
Y, Y ∗ 0.684 0.608 0.786
λ, λ∗ 0.697 0.609 0.845
Rk
R
,
R∗k
R∗ 0.908 0.662 0.871
QK,Q∗K∗ 0.686 0.498 0.995
Table 3.3: Cross-Country Correlations
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Correlation Baseline Domestic credit Full diversification
between µb = 0.91 µb = 0.5
Y, Y ∗ 0.457 0.608 0.972
λ, λ∗ 0.590 0.609 0.981
Rk
R
,
R∗k
R∗ 0.810 0.662 0.228
QK,Q∗K∗ 0.384 0.498 0.987
Table 3.4: Cross-Country Correlations (Only Capital Quality Shocks)
Although it is difficult to entirely determine what exactly drives the findings
presented in section 3.5.1, it can be concluded that if the central bank reacts
to indicator variables which are highly correlated between countries, it might be
welfare-superior to resort to union-wide rules as opposed to country-specific rules.
If indicators are highly correlated, union-wide rules provide similar stabilization
in the economy hit by the shock while overstabilization in the economy spared by
the shock is smaller, rendering union-wide rules preferable over country-specific
rules. As explained in the introduction, this can be rationalized with the fact that
I consider a second-best environment. When financial frictions cannot be fully
eliminated, the effects of unconventional monetary policy on welfare are two-fold.
On one hand, reductions in volatility reduce the financial accelerator and please
the consumption-smoothing motive of the consumer. On the other hand, reductions
in volatility might prevent precautionary behavior, such as precautionary saving
and capital accumulation. Therefore, depending on the cross-country correlation
of the indicator variables, the overall welfare effects can either be higher for rules
providing relatively less stabilization in the economy hit by the shock but relatively
more stabilization in the other country (=union-wide rules) or for rules providing
relatively more stabilization in the economy hit by the shock but relatively less in
the other economy (=country-specific rules).
3.5.3 Optimal Simple Rules in an Asymmetric Setup
It is very often argued, that unconventional monetary policy can cause free-riding
behavior and lower the incentives to reform financial structures. This is especially
relevant in a financially heterogeneous monetary union where the risks and costs
of unconventional monetary policy are shared among member countries. In this
section, I consider the case where country H has a more sound financial system
than country F . This is modeled by introducing a macroprudential instrument
with similar effects as a countercyclical capital buffer in country H.26
26The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2017) reports considerable cross-country
differences in the implementation of the countercyclical capital buffer required by the Basel III
framework.
58 CHAPTER 3. UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY
Regarding the implementation of the capital requirement, I follow Ghilardi and
Peiris (2016) and Levine and Lima (2015) by introducing a countercyclical subsidy
on net worth, τNt , which adjusts in proportion to variations in the credit-to-GDP-
ratio27
ln(1 + τNt ) = −κτ ln
(
Bt/Yt
B/Y
)
, (3.57)
where κτ = 0.1.
In general, a subsidy on net worth changes the marginal cost of borrowing
from households. If implemented in a countercyclical fashion, the subsidy increases
whenever the economy performs below average, reducing lending costs, hence,
facilitating lending activities, while it precludes the economy from overheating
during economic upswings by increasing the cost of borrowing.
Given the subsidy, intermediary i’s net worth evolves according to the following
equation
Ni,t = R
A
t Bi,t−1 −Rt−1DBi,t−1 + τNt−1Ni,t−1.
Solving the banks’ maximization problem in the presence of the subsidy, the
marginal cost of deposits (formerly given by equation (3.13)) changes to
ηt = EtΩt,t+1(Rt + τ
N
t ). (3.58)
On an aggregate level, only the net worth of existing bankers (formerly given by
equation (3.17), or, in the presence of liquidity facilities, by equation (3.34)) is
affected by the macroprudential subsidy, i.e.,
Ne,t = θb
[
(RAt −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1 + τNt−1
]
Nt−1. (3.59)
In this asymmetric setup, the optimal policy coefficients of the country-specific
unconventional monetary policy rules will obviously differ between countries, i.e.,
κm 6= κ∗m and κf 6= κ∗f in the country-specific rules. Since I assume that uncon-
ventional monetary policy is conducted by a single authority, reaction coefficients
κm and κ
∗
m, or κf and κ
∗
f , respectively, are chosen to jointly maximize union-wide
welfare.
Table 3.5 shows the welfare results for such a heterogeneous monetary union. To
facilitate comparisons, column (6) provides the welfare results for the baseline case
discussed in section 3.5.1, in which neither country had implemented any financial
regulation. First of all, it should be noted that without unconventional monetary
27Ghilardi and Peiris (2016) use foreign borrowing as an indicator variable and Levine and
Lima (2015) employ a whole set of different indicator variables in the macroprudential rule.
However, as it is generally agreed that macroprudential instruments should prevent excessive
credit development (see, e.g., Lang and Welz, 2017), the credit-to-GDP-ratio seems to be a natural
choice for an indicator variable in a macroprudential rule in the given model.
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policy, welfare in the financially more regulated country and average union-wide
welfare are higher than in the baseline scenario where both countries are symmetric
and macroprudential regulations are absent (gH , gUN > g). Welfare in the financially
less regulated economy, however, is slightly lower compared to the baseline case
(gF < g), which implies a negative externality of the introduction of macroprudential
policy in a single country. A possible explanation for this result is that in the
stochastic steady state, the financially regulated country (H) resumes some of the
financial activities of the other country. Due to home bias in asset holdings this
implies a higher capital stock and, hence, higher consumption in country H at the
expense of country F . The latter result changes, once unconventional monetary
policy is introduced. In combination with any unconventional monetary policy rule
considered, country F also profits from the introduction of macroprudential policy
in country H.
Home Foreign Union Symmetric
(regulated (non-regulated average union
fin. sector) fin. sector) (table 3.2)
κf , κm g
H κf , κm g
F gUN g
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No UMP - -3.17 - -3.76 -3.46 -3.69
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 66 -2.45 56 -3.09 -2.77 -3.22
LF, un. 69 -2.44 69 -3.06 -2.75 -3.15
CCP, cou. 330 1.87 185 -1.60 0.13 -2.23
CCP, un. 330 2.93 330 -1.75 0.57 -2.09
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 40 0.07 69 2.64 1.35 2.50
LF, un. 63 0.20 63 2.04 1.12 2.28
CCP, cou. 23 1.23 330 3.80 2.51 4.17
CCP, un. 46 0.58 46 2.44 1.50 3.78
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP:
corporate credit policy. Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal
feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm: optimal feedback coefficient for
credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent of steady-
state consumption.
Table 3.5: Optimal Simple Rules and Welfare Gains with Structurally
Heterogeneous Countries
A further finding is that, once the common central bank adopts a credit growth
rule for the conduct of unconventional policies, the macroprudential regulation
in country H ceases to be welfare-improving – from the viewpoint of country
H and from the viewpoint of the union as a whole (gH , gUN < g). A possible
reason for this result is the way the macroprudential rule in country H is specified:
As τNt , the macroprudential policy instrument, reacts to a credit measure, its
stabilization effects might partly overlap with those of unconventional policies
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reacting to credit growth. In the following analysis, only the policy combinations
which are welfare-improving from the viewpoint of the union will be considered.
The results might imply that unconventional monetary policy aggravates free-
riding behavior on the part of a country with a less stable financial sector. To
evaluate whether the incentives to reform financial structures are affected by the
introduction of unconventional monetary policy measures, country F ’s welfare
gains from unconventional policy provided in column (4) of table 3.5 have to be
compared to its welfare gains in the counterfactual case in which it also adopts a
macroprudential policy measure. Note that in this case, the two countries of the
union would be perfectly symmetric again.
Table 3.6 shows the welfare gains for country F resulting from different un-
conventional monetary policy regimes, with and without a reform of the financial
sector in country F , respectively, and the difference between the two. As indicated
by the positive values in the last column, country F profits from a reform of its
own financial sector in the first four regimes considered. However, compared to the
case without unconventional monetary policy, incentives to reform are considerably
reduced when the central bank provides credit to the banking system or purchases
corporate sector assets. For corporate sector credit policy conducted in a union-wide
fashion, incentives to reform even cease to exist.
gF , gF , Relative gain
no reform reform from reform
(1) (2) (2)-(1)
No UMP -3.76 -3.19 0.57
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. -3.09 -3.06 0.03
LF, un. -3.06 -3.05 0.01
CCP, cou. -1.60 -1.51 0.09
CCP, un. -1.75 -1.75 0.00
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquid-
ity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy. Cou.: country-
specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient
for liquidity facilities. κm: optimal feedback coefficient
for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equiva-
lents in percent of steady-state consumption.
Table 3.6: Incentives to Reform Financial Struc-
tures in the Foreign Economy
The results of this section imply that the introduction of unconventional mon-
etary policy in a structurally heterogeneous monetary union might reduce the
incentives to reform financial structures in individual countries. The analysis
constitutes a first approach to modeling and analyzing the interplay between uncon-
ventional monetary policy and structural heterogeneity in a monetary union. The
results cannot be generalized to the wide range of structural asymmetries found
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in, e.g., the European Union. I plan on deepening the analysis of unconventional
monetary policy in a heterogeneous monetary union.
3.6 Conclusion
In recent years, the ECB has adopted a wide array of unconventional monetary policy
measures. All of them were decided upon on a centralized level, i.e., responding
to union-wide conditions. However, while some (several purchase programs) were
made available to recipients in Eurozone countries in a fixed manner, according to
their respective country’s key, others (e.g., liquidity provision) were provided to
recipients flexibly according to specific needs and regardless of nationality. Hence,
while the former can be seen as measures addressing union-wide circumstances,
the latter allow a tailor-made response to country-specific shocks. This paper
analyzes the welfare implication of a small sample of unconventional monetary
policy measures and, in particular, distinguishes between country-specific and
union-wide approaches. Since the subject of cross-country heterogeneity is an
important factor when discussing the risks and benefits of unconventional policies
in a monetary union, I also consider the case of a structurally asymmetric monetary
union.
The results obtained from these analyses provide some important policy impli-
cations for a monetary union. First, I show that from a theoretical point of view, it
is not in general welfare-improving to use unconventional instruments to address
country-specific shocks. However, union-wide policy can only yield higher welfare
than country-specific policy, when the central bank reacts upon indicators which
are highly correlated between countries. If – for whatever reason – such indicators
are not available (measurement problems, high divergence between countries etc.),
union-wide policy can lead to welfare losses relative to country-specific policy. That
this is a relevant problem in the European Union is, e.g., found by Macchiarelli
et al. (2017, p. 5) who report that “corporates in countries like Italy and Spain,
where the banking system is more under pressure, might benefit less from the
CSPP [Corporate Sector Purchase Program; note from the author]”. It is difficult
to imagine how some of the unconventional monetary policy instruments, such as
corporate sector asset purchases, can be provided in a more targeted (i.e., country-
specific) way. However, they could, for example, be accompanied by programs which
facilitate access to bond markets and support firms in troubled countries or market
segments in meeting the eligibility criteria for bond purchase programs. Second,
the analysis of a heterogeneous union showed that unconventional monetary policy
– regardless of whether it is conducted in a union-wide or country-specific manner –
might lower the incentives to conduct regulatory reforms in single countries. This
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result supports the case for pushing forward the banking union in order to unify
supervision and regulation across countries.
The analysis can be extended in various dimensions. In the given setup, the
performance of the different optimal rules should be compared against Ramsey
optimal policy. Furthermore, I plan to solve the model under the assumption
that the zero-lower bound is binding. This assumption is going to render welfare
calculations much more difficult. However, in a first step, it will be interesting
to see whether the results of the impulse response and the correlation analyses
remain qualitatively the same. An interesting extension to the model, which would,
however, go beyond the scope of this paper, is the addition of sovereign bonds to
banks’ balance sheets and an explicit modeling of government risk. Such a setup
would allow the modeling of the so-called “bank-sovereign nexus” and a realistic
analysis of a public sector purchase program. Another interesting extension would
be to take into account game theoretical issues associated with macroprudential
policies being implemented on a national level and unconventional policies being
implemented on a union-wide level.
Chapter 4
Endogenous Portfolio Choice by
Banks and the International
Risk-Sharing Puzzle
Abstract
International consumption risk-sharing is relatively low compared
to what theoretical models would predict given the high level of
international financial market integration. I show that a model in
which leverage-constrained financial intermediaries undertake the in-
ternational portfolio choice decision instead of households can provide
an explanation for this puzzle. The optimal portfolio composition
chosen by financial intermediaries does, in general, not induce the
highest possible degree of consumption risk-sharing. In particular,
financial intermediaries choose to hold too many home assets. This
result is driven by an agency problem which causes the motives of
bankers and households to diverge. While a direct reduction of the
financial friction has a positive impact on international consumption
risk-sharing, the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer does
not have the same desirable consequences.
Keywords: International Business Cycles; Financial Frictions; Con-
sumption risk-sharing; Portfolio Choice; Macroprudential Policy
JEL Classification: E44, F30, F44
4.1 Introduction
An important function of international financial markets is to allow individuals to
insure themselves against country-specific risk. During the last decades, globalization
has been characterized by a striking increase in financial market integration (e.g.,
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Yet, there is vast evidence, that consumption risk-
sharing is modest at best and has increased much less throughout the same period
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of time (e.g., Kose et al., 2009). Closely related to this international risk-sharing
puzzle – the fact that consumption risk-sharing is generally low despite the high
level of financial market integration – is the finding of strong and persistent home
bias in debt and equity holdings.1 As foreign assets generally provide better hedging
opportunities, standard macro-finance theory predicts much higher international
portfolio diversification (e.g., Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012).
This chapter assesses the role of financial intermediaries for international portfo-
lio choice and consumption risk-sharing. To this end, I set up a two-country DSGE
model featuring leverage-constrained financial intermediaries modeled as in Gertler
and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) who hold risky claims on home
and foreign capital as in Dedola et al. (2013) and Carniti (2012). It is assumed that
the number of states exceeds the number of state-contingent assets traded interna-
tionally which, in general, leads to incomplete consumption risk-sharing between
countries. In this setup, I also consider the role of macroprudential policy, designed
to reduce the adverse effects of financial frictions, for international portfolio choice
and consumption risk-sharing.
I find that the assumption that financial intermediaries choose the international
portfolio can account for relatively low consumption risk-sharing compared to what
could be achieved at the given level of financial market integration. A further
interesting finding is that under the assumption that technology shocks are the
only driving force behind business cycles, the model can even replicate realistic
values of home bias in equity holdings.
These findings can be explained with the presence of a financial friction which
drives a wedge between the incentives of households and financial intermediaries
– the latter being the agents who choose the international portfolio (see also
Maggiori, 2017). Households are primarily concerned about consumption risk.
Hence, a portfolio optimally chosen by households coincides with the portfolio
which yields the highest possible degree of consumption risk-sharing. As banks are
owned by households, they internalize the objectives of households. However, due
to an agency problem between bankers and depositors, they have an additional
motive, namely the maximization of net wealth which is needed to obtain external
funding (Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2011). Hence, banks’
portfolio choice is motivated not only by their concern about consumption risk
but also by their concern about financial risk, the latter consisting in net wealth
fluctuations (cf. Maggiori, 2017). Therefore, unless consumption risk and financial
risk are perfectly correlated, the chosen portfolio is different from the one which
yields the highest possible degree of consumption risk-sharing. In particular, for
positive correlations between consumption risk and financial risk, banks prefer
1Sorensen et al. (2007) refer to home bias and international risk-sharing as “twin puzzles
separated at birth”.
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a more balanced portfolio than what would yield highest possible consumption
risk-sharing. This minimizes the risk of large shocks to the aggregate net wealth of
the banking system.
It is further shown, that reducing the financial friction directly induces financial
intermediaries to hold more foreign assets which has a positive impact on inter-
national consumption risk-sharing. However, reducing the effects of the financial
friction on the real economy through the introduction of a countercyclical capital
buffer does not have the same desirable consequences for international consumption
risk-sharing.
The analyses conducted in this chapter contribute to the literature on inter-
national consumption risk-sharing as well as to the literature on international
portfolio choice. In most endogenous portfolio choice models,2 households under-
take the portfolio decision, which – as explained above – results in a portfolio
composition which maximizes international consumption risk-sharing.3 And, as
Kollmann (2012, p. 567) points out, this usually results in a “surprising amount
of cross-country risk pooling”, even if the set of internationally traded assets is
very small. Hence, these models lack the ability to provide an explanation to the
international risk-sharing puzzle. Dedola et al. (2013) and Carniti (2012) set up
models in which leverage-constrained financial intermediaries a´ la Gertler and
Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) choose the international portfolio.
However, they do not analyze the implications of this feature for international
risk-sharing in more detail. Maggiori (2017) uses a very similar setup of the bank-
ing system, with banks choosing the international portfolio, and shows that the
existence of financial frictions, which introduce an additional motive for bankers,
can account for several empirical findings related to risk-sharing between financially
asymmetric countries. My results are driven by the same mechanism, however, as
Maggiori (2017) considers a continuous time endowment model with asymmetric
countries, the analyses can be seen as complementary to mine. Finally, Kollmann
(2012) considers the role of limited access to financial markets for international
consumption risk-sharing. He assumes that international financial markets are
complete, but that only a subset of households has access to these markets while
the remaining households consume hand-to-mouth. This setup also allows to match
certain empirical regularities related to international consumption risk-sharing. To
the extent of my knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the role of the size of
the financial friction and of macroprudential policy – besides capital controls – for
international consumption risk-sharing.
2There is a fairly large number of contributions building on the method proposed by Devereux
and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a), which is also used here.
3In some earlier contributions with financial frictions, so-called entrepreneurs choose the
international portfolio (Devereux and Yetman, 2010; Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Yao, 2012).
However, as these agents are modeled as a type of household they also choose a portfolio which
minimizes consumption risk.
66 CHAPTER 4. PORTFOLIO CHOICE AND RISK-SHARING
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the model.
Section 4.3 explains the calibration and section 4.4 the solution method. In section
4.5, I present and discuss the results. The final section concludes and gives an
outlook.
4.2 Model
For the analysis, I use the model developed in chapter 2. Therein, I assume that the
world consists of two equally sized countries with symmetric structures. There are
four types of optimizing agents in each country – households, final goods producers,
capital goods producers and banks. Households consume a homogeneous consump-
tion good, produced by final goods producers in both countries. Furthermore, they
supply labor to home final goods firms and save in the form of bank deposits. Period
utility is separable in consumption and leisure. The final good is produced from
domestic labor and capital. Production is subject to country-specific technology
and capital quality shocks. Final goods producers purchase physical capital from
domestic capital goods producers, whereby capital purchases are financed with
home and foreign bank loans. Depreciated capital is resold to domestic capital
goods producers. The latter face convex capital adjustment costs in the process of
refurbishing depreciated capital and investing into new capital.
The banking sector is modeled as in Gertler and Karadi (2011). The role of
financial intermediaries is to transfer funds between households and final goods pro-
ducers who use the loans to finance investment into physical capital. Intermediaries
face an endogenously determined constraint on their leverage ratio, motivated by a
simple agency problem which drives a wedge between saving and borrowing rates.
The two-country version of the model developed in this thesis features asset market
integration, i.e., intermediaries can purchase state-contingent financial claims on
final goods producing firms at home and abroad as in Dedola et al. (2013) and
Carniti (2012). The integration of asset markets introduces an endogenous portfolio
choice problem, as returns to equity are subject to country-specific risk. I solve
this problem using the method proposed by Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008;
2011a). Furthermore, I assume that deposit markets are integrated. In particular,
I introduce international intermediaries into the model, which – according to the
needs in the financial system – channel the deposits of households in the two
countries to home and foreign banks. Allowing the net foreign asset position to be
adjusted via two margins - asset and deposit trade - might imply two unit roots in
a first-order approximation of the model (see, e.g., Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003).
Hence, I introduce two stationarity-inducing features, an endogenous discount
factor and a debt-elastic interest rate yield on internationally traded deposits. Since
the details of the model have been discussed in chapter 2, I turn directly to the
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equilibrium conditions of the model. For simplicity, only home country equations
will be displayed. Foreign variables will be denoted with an asterisk.
4.2.1 Some Equilibrium Equations
The consumption Euler equation reads
1 = β(CA,t)EtΛt,t+1Rt, (4.1)
with the household’s real stochastic discount factor being defined as Λt,t+1 ≡ λt+1λt ,
where marginal utility of consumption is given by λt = C
−1
t . The return on bank
deposits, which are equivalent to real riskless one period bonds, is given by Rt. Note
that CA,t is aggregate home consumption which enters the household’s consumption
maximization problem via the endogenous discount factor β(CA,t), whose functional
form is given by
β(CA,t) ≡ ωc(1 + CA,t)−ηc , (4.2)
as in Devereux and Yetman (2010). Parameter ηc drives the elasticity of the discount
factor with respect to consumption while ωc is used to tie down the steady state
of the stochastic discount factor to a certain value. Furthermore, it is implicitly
assumed, that households provide their deposits to savings banks which – according
to the needs in the financial system – channel the funds to home and foreign
banks via international intermediaries. International intermediaries charge a small
interest-rate premium on the real interest rate, hence, home and foreign deposits
rates are only imperfectly correlated. The premium depends on the real net foreign
bond position of the respective country (see, e.g., Hjortsoe, 2016)
Rt = R
∗
t (1− ωdDF,t), (4.3)
where DF,t denotes home households’ deposits provided to foreign banks which is
equivalent to the real net foreign bond position. Note that in the deterministic
steady state DF = 0. Parameter ωd determines the size of the interest-rate premium.
Households’ optimal labor supply to domestic final goods producers is given by
wt = χ
Lφt
λt
, (4.4)
where wt denotes the real wage and Lt hours worked. Parameter χ is the weight
of the disutility of labor in the utility function and φ is the inverse of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply.
Home financial intermediaries channel deposits from home and foreign house-
holds, DH,t and D
∗
H,t, respectively, to home and foreign final goods producers. In
addition to obtaining funds from households, banks also raise funds internally by
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accumulating retained earnings. Hence, the banking sectors’ balance sheet reads
QtSH,t +Q
∗
tSF,t = D
B
t +Nt. (4.5)
where Nt denotes the banking sectors’ net worth. Variables SH,t and SF,t denote
home banks’ state-contingent claims on future returns of a unit of capital used in
final good production in the home and the foreign economy, i.e., claims on Rk,t+1 and
R∗k,t+1, respectively. Total deposits at home banks are denoted as D
B
t ≡ DH,t+D∗H,t.
Note that in the given setup, home banks have to pay the home real deposit rate
Rt on all deposits. There is a continuum of banks in the financial intermediation
sector. Each period, a fraction 1 − θb of banks exits the business and pays out
retained earnings to the household sector in a lump-sum fashion. The aggregate
net worth of those banks who remain in business, Ne,t, evolves according to the
following equation
Ne,t = θb
[(
(Rk,t −Rt−1)− Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1
Bt−1
(Rk,t −R∗k,t)
)
φt−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1, (4.6)
where Bt ≡ QtSH,t + Q∗tSF,t are aggregate assets and φt ≡ BtNt is the ratio of
intermediated assets to net worth, which will be referred to as the leverage ratio.
New bankers are provided with start-up funds proportional to last periods’ aggregate
assets, hence, entering banks’ net worth is given by
Nn,t = ωb(Qt−1SH,t−1 +Q∗t−1SF,t−1), (4.7)
where ωb is the fraction of assets given to new bankers by households. Aggregate
banking sectors’ net worth can therefore be expressed as the sum of existing and
new banks’ net worth
Nt = Nn,t +Ne,t ΞN,t, (4.8)
where ΞN,t denotes an exogenous disturbance to existing bankers’ net wealth. To
motivate the requirement to build up net worth, a moral hazard problem is assumed:
A banker can choose to divert the fraction 0 < λb < 1 of available funds. The cost
associated with this fraud is that depositors recover the remaining fraction and
force the banker into bankruptcy. Therefore, for households to be willing to deposit
funds with bank i, the continuation value of bank i, Vi,t must be larger than or
equal to the value of funds the banker can divert, i.e.,
Vi,t ≥ λbBi,t. (4.9)
Assuming optimizing behavior and symmetric banks in equilibrium, it can be shown,
that the marginal values of an additional unit of home and foreign capital, νH,t and
νF,t, respectively, and the marginal value of an additional unit of net worth, ηt, are
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functions of the returns on capital assets and deposits
νH,t = EtΩt,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt), (4.10)
νF,t = EtΩt,t+1(R
∗
kt+1 −Rt), (4.11)
ηt = EtΩt,t+1Rt. (4.12)
A further first-order condition is given by
νH,t = νF,t ≡ νt+1 ⇔ EtΩt,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1R∗k,t+1, (4.13)
which is the first-order condition relevant for international portfolio choice as will be
explained further in section 4.4. Variable Ωt,t+1 represents the stochastic discount
factor of the bank. It is defined as
Ωt,t+1 = β(CA,t)Λt,t+1 [(1− θb) + θb (ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1)] . (4.14)
This discount factor is a key variable for the determination of international portfolio
positions and the main results of this chapter. Hence, it deserves further elabo-
ration. Note that Ωt,t+1 contains the stochastic discount factor of the household,
β(CA,t)Λt,t+1, as banks are owned by households. However, the existence of a finan-
cial friction drives a wedge between households’ and banks’ motives which causes
the discount factors to differ. If the banker knew that she was going to exit business
in the next period, i.e., θb = 0, the stochastic discount factors were the same. In this
particular case, bankers were only concerned about consumption risk. If, however,
there is a positive probability that the bank continues to exist, 0 < θb < 1, the
banker also cares about banking risk, i.e., fluctuations of net worth. In this case,
her intertemporal choices are also influenced by her expectations regarding the
future shadow value of net worth, ηt+1, and the future shadow value of leveraging
up, νt+1φt+1.
The Cobb-Douglas production function of the representative final goods firm is
given by
Yt = At(ΨtKt−1)αL1−αt , (4.15)
where Yt denotes output, At exogenous technology and Ψt exogenous capital quality.
Parameter α determines the output elasticity of capital. Capital Kt−1 was bought
from capital goods producers in the same country in the previous period at price
Qt−1. The law of motion for capital is given by
Kt = It + (1− δ)ΨtKt−1, (4.16)
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where It is aggregate investment and δ denotes physical depreciation. Solving the
final goods producer’s profit maximization problem yields the ex post return to
capital
Rk,t+1 =
αYt+1
Kt
+ (1− δ)Ψt+1Qt+1
Qt
, (4.17)
and the optimal labor demand of the firm
wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
. (4.18)
Capital goods producers choose the optimal level of investment in the presence
of convex capital adjustment costs whose functional form is given by
f (·) = ηI
2
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)2
δKt−1
It
, (4.19)
as in Dedola et al. (2013). Parameter ηI denotes the inverse elasticity of investment
with respect to the price of capital. Given optimal behavior, the real price of one
unit of capital is given by
Qt = 1 + ηI
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)
. (4.20)
Finally, the capital market clearing condition states that in each country, the
current value of total installed capital has to be equal to the total value of state-
contingent claims on future returns of capital
QtKt = Qt(SH,t + S
∗
H,t). (4.21)
Final goods market clearing is given by
Yt + Y
∗
t = Ct + C
∗
t + [1 + f(·)]It + [1 + f ∗(·)]I∗t . (4.22)
The home aggregate resource constraint is derived from aggregation of the budget
constraints over home households, considering profits from the ownership of firms,
retained earnings from exiting bankers and transfers to new bankers
Yt +Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1R
∗
k,t−1 −Qt−1S∗H,t−1Rk,t−1 +DF,t−1Rt−1 + 0.5piIFIt
= Ct + [1 + f(·)]It +Q∗tSF,t −QtS∗H,t +DF,t, (4.23)
where piIFIt = (R
∗
t −Rt)DF,t are profits from international financial intermediaries
which are equally split between countries.
The full set of equilibrium conditions of the model can be found in the appendix
(section A.2.1 of appendix A).
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4.3 Calibration
Parameter Description Value Source
Households
φ inverse of Frisch elasticity 0.276 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
χ utility weight of labor 3.404
ηc parameter from discount
factor
0.010 Devereux and Sutherland
(2009)
ωc parameter capturing steady-
state savings propensity
0.996
ωd yield sensitivity to debt 0.010 Hjortsoe (2016)
Capital goods firms
ηI inverse elasticity of invest-
ment with respect to price of
capital
1.728 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Final goods firms
α output elasticity of capital 0.330 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
δ depreciation rate 0.025 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
Financial intermediaries
λb fraction of divertable assets 0.486
ωb transfer to entering banks 0.003
θb quarterly survival rate of
banks
0.960
Exogenous processes
ρψ persistence of capital quality
shock
0.66 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρA persistence of technology
shock
0.95 Gertler and Karadi (2011)
ρN persistence of net wealth
shock
0.66
σψ, σA, σN standard deviation of shocks 0.01
Table 4.1: Parameters
Table 4.1 reports the baseline calibration and its sources. The time unit is one
quarter. Most parameters are quite standard and do not need to be discussed.
The weight of labor in the utility function was chosen such that the household
devotes one third of her time to work.
Regarding the banking sector parameters, in this chapter, I deviate from the
calibration proposed by Gertler and Karadi (2011). In particular, I set θb to match
an average lifetime of a bank of 6.25 years. The reason is that this parameter choice
allows me to hold the parameter constant throughout the experiments conducted in
section 4.5.2.4 The other two banking sector parameters, λb, the divertable fraction
of assets and ωb, the transfer to entering bankers, where jointly chosen to match a
4A θb of 0.972 would render the fraction of divertable assets very high (> 70%) if combined
with the higher credit spread. Furthermore, parameter ωb turns negative if θb = 0.972 is combined
with a steady-state leverage ratio of four and an interest rate spread of 200 basis points.
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steady-state leverage ratio of four, as in Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2011), and a steady-state interest rate spread of 200 basis points. The
latter is higher than the pre-crisis spread reported in Gertler and Karadi (2011)
and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011) but lies between the values reported by Fiore
and Uhlig (2011) (170 basis points) and Zˇivanovic´ (2017) (258 basis points) for
the US. In section 4.5.2, I analyze the implications of varying the banking sector
parameters.5
Parameter ηc in the endogenous discount factor was taken from Devereux and
Sutherland (2009). In general, it should be noted that this parameter can have
considerable implications for steady-state portfolio choice and risk-sharing. Hence,
it should be set to a small value. However, choosing it to be too small induces a
unit root in a first-order approximation of the model. Given ηc = 0.01 and the
steady-state value of consumption, parameter ωc was chosen as to guarantee an
annual steady-state interest rate of 4%, i.e., a steady-state value of β(CA) of 0.99.
The three exogenous variables At, Ψt and ΞN,t are assumed to follow AR(1)
processes. Persistency and standard deviation of the technology shock are taken
from Gertler and Karadi (2011). The persistency of the net wealth shock is set to
0.66 which is equal to the persistency of the capital quality shock. The reason is
that the capital quality shock, as well as the net wealth shock directly affect stock
variables and, hence, feature a high endogenous persistency. The size of the capital
quality shock is set equal to the standard deviation of the other shocks.
4.4 Portfolio Indeterminacy and Solution
Method
Recall home banks’ first-order condition for international portfolio choice
EtΩt,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1R
∗
kt+1. (4.13)
Evaluated in the non-stochastic steady state, this equation reads
Rk = R
∗
k,
and, approximated up to first order,
EtRk,t+1 ≈ EtR∗k,t+1.
5The value of 49% for the fraction of divertable assets is – admittedly – quite high. However,
this can be justified with the fact that this parameter does not have a direct empirical counterpart
but is used to calibrate the steady-state interest rate spread and leverage ratio to resemble realistic
values.
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Hence, in the steady state and in expectations evaluated up to first-order, both
assets pay the same return. This implies that all possible compositions of banks’
asset portfolios, given by Bt = QtSH,t + Q
∗
tSF,t, yield the same expected return,
i.e., international portfolio choice is indeterminate up to first-order accuracy. The
economic intuition behind this indeterminacy problem is that the two capital
assets are only distinguishable in terms of their risk characteristics which can
only be captured with an approximation of second-order or higher (Devereux and
Sutherland, 2008).
To overcome the indeterminacy problem, I use the local method proposed by
Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a). Other local and global methods have
been proposed by other authors,6 however, the method developed by Devereux
and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a) is particularly appealing as it uses well-known
perturbation techniques and can be quite easily incorporated into otherwise standard
programs used to solve DSGE models, e.g., Dynare. It is based on the observation
that in models of this kind, only steady-state portfolio holding matter for the
first-order dynamics of the remaining variables. In a nutshell, this can be shown by
rewriting the model in a way that portfolio holdings always appear in a product
with future excess returns, i.e., in the form of SF,tRx,t+1 and SF,t−1Rx,t, where excess
returns are defined as Rx,t ≡ Rk,t−R∗k,t. Per construction, up to first-order accuracy,
Rx,t is equivalent to an exogenous, independent mean-zero i.i.d. random variable.
Therefore, in a first order-approximation of the model, the terms SF,tRx,t+1 and
SF,t−1Rx,t always reduce to SFRx,t+1 and SFRx,t, respectively, where SF denotes
steady-state portfolio holdings.
Following Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a), steady-state portfolio
holdings can be found using a second-order approximation of the portfolio equations
and a first-order approximation of the non-portfolio parts of the model. An approx-
imation of this kind allows to take into account the risk characteristics of the assets.
In practice, it is not necessary to actually conduct the second-order approximation
of the portfolio parts of the model, as second-order accurate solutions to policy
functions can be obtained using purely linear solution methods (see, e.g., Lombardo
and Sutherland, 2007). To apply the solution technique, first, the model needs to
be rewritten as described in the previous paragraph whereby steady-state portfolio
holdings are set equal to zero and Rx,t is replaced by ξt, an exogenous, independent
mean-zero i.i.d. random variable, whenever Rx,t appears in a cross-product with
portfolio holdings.7 Now, the model can be solved using any linear approximation
6The methods proposed by Tille and van Wincoop (2010) and Evans and Hnatkovska (2005)
also employ perturbation around a non-stochastic steady state to find international portfolios
while Coeurdacier et al. (2011) and Juillard (2011) propose to find international portfolios by
approximating DSGE models around the risky steady state. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2015)
are able to solve a model featuring an international portfolio choice problem by solving it globally
using continuous time.
7The set of rewritten equilibrium equations can be found in section A.2.2 of appendix A.
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method. In a second step, one needs to find the steady-state portfolio holdings
which make the first-order condition for portfolio choice, equation (4.13), together
with its foreign counterpart,
EtΩ
∗
t,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩ
∗
t,t+1R
∗
kt+1, (4.13*)
hold up to second-order. This can be done by combining the variance-covariance
matrix of the underlying shocks with certain policy functions obtained in step one,8
using a formula derived in Devereux and Sutherland (2007; 2008; 2011a).
Alternatively, the second step of the solution method can be replaced by brute
force. Combining equation (4.13) with its foreign counterpart, equation (4.13*),
yields
Et(Ωt,t+1 − Ω∗t,t+1)Rx,t+1 = 0. (4.24)
According to the latter, the optimal portfolio is the one for which cov(Ωt−1,t −
Ω∗t−1,t, Rx,t) = 0. Hence, solving the rewritten model repeatedly for different values
of steady-state portfolio holdings and extracting the resulting covariances between
the difference between Ωt−1,t − Ω∗t−1,t and Rx,t can also reveal the (locally) optimal
steady-state portfolio. Figure 4.1 in section 4.5.1 contains a graphical representation
of this method. The vertical blue line in the first plot marks the optimal foreign
equity share.
As mentioned in the introduction, in most endogenous portfolio choice models,
households undertake the portfolio decision. In this case, the optimal portfolio is
the one which solves
Et(Λt,t+1 − Λ∗t,t+1)Rx,t+1 = 0, (4.25)
up to second-order accuracy, where Rx,t+1 again refers to the excess return of home
over foreign assets. It can be a scalar or a vector, depending on the number of
traded assets in the particular model. By construction, a portfolio which solves
equation (4.25) also maximizes consumption risk-sharing in such a model.
In the present model, described in section 4.2, the stochastic discount fac-
tor relevant for international portfolio choice differs from the households’ one,
i.e., Ωt,t+1 6= Λt,t+1. Hence, there is, generally, no reason to assume that interna-
tional consumption risk-sharing will be at its optimum. Furthermore, in the given
framework the particular portfolio which maximizes international consumption
risk-sharing is not the one which solves equation (4.25). The reason is, that in my
model, households do not have direct access to the state-contingent returns of the
assets. Hence, a portfolio which renders the difference in households’ stochastic
discount factors orthogonal to the excess return on home assets does not have any
economic meaning in the framework considered here.
8In particular, one needs to obtain the policy functions of Ωt−1,t − Ω∗t−1,t and of Rk,t −R∗k,t
in reaction to all shocks, including ξt.
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The next section will present and discuss the results. To obtain readily in-
terpretable results on international portfolio holdings, I define portfolio holdings
as the share of foreign capital holdings in home banks’ portfolios, which – due
to symmetry – is equal to the share of home capital holdings in foreign banks’
portfolios, i.e.,
γt ≡ Q
∗
tSF,t
Q∗tSF,t +QtSH,t
=
QtS
∗
H,t
Q∗tS∗F,t +QtS
∗
H,t
.
The steady-state portfolio share optimally chosen by banks, i.e., the one which
solves equation (4.24) up to second-order accuracy, is denoted by γB. Given the
research question, another portfolio share of interest is the one which maximizes
consumption risk-sharing. As stated above, in this model, the portfolio which
maximizes international consumption risk-sharing is not the one which solves
equation (4.25). Instead, I will determine the portfolio share which maximizes the
correlation between home and foreign marginal utilities, because in a two-country
DSGE model without real exchange rate fluctuations, the correlation between home
and foreign marginal utilities reflects the degree of consumption risk-sharing (see,
e.g., Nuntramas, 2011). A correlation coefficient of one implies perfect risk-sharing.
The risk-sharing maximizing portfolio share is denoted by γRS.
Last but not least, in some instances, I will report the optimal portfolio share
chosen by households for the same model, but with the banking sector removed. In
this case, households directly receive the state-contingent returns of the assets. The
corresponding portfolio share is denoted by γHH . Note that γHH solves equation
(4.25).
4.5 Results
In this section, I first present and discuss the optimal steady-state portfolio share
chosen by banks and the degree of international consumption risk-sharing associated
with it. In subsection 4.5.2, I consider the effects of changing the size of the financial
friction on the results obtained in 4.5.1. Lastly, in subsection 4.5.3, I analyze
whether and how the introduction of macroprudential policy alters the implications
of portfolio choice by banks for international consumption risk-sharing.
4.5.1 Steady-State Portfolio Holdings and Implications for
Risk-Sharing
Using the baseline calibration, the steady-state foreign equity share amounts to
0.62, i.e., financial intermediaries hold a portfolio with a foreign bias. This result is
fairly robust to varying parameter values, except for the calibration of the shock
processes, the implications of which are discussed below. Data on international
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portfolio holdings show that developed countries exhibit an equity home bias of
60− 80%, i.e., a γB of 0.2− 0.4 (see, e.g., Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012). The baseline
version of this model cannot replicate this characteristic of international financial
markets – a weakness shared by many other two-country models with endogenous
portfolio choice. The reason is that risk averse agents prefer assets which promise a
high payoff during bad states of the economy. In standard open economy models9,
the class of assets which matches this criterion best is foreign equity. For households,
bad states are, in general, states in which labor income is low. The reason is, that
when a Cobb-Douglas production function is used, returns on domestic labor and
capital are highly correlated (see, e.g., Coeurdacier and Rey, 2012). As bankers
are owned by households, the insurance of labor income constitutes at least part
of their motive. There are various contributions proposing certain model features
which lead to equity home bias in international portfolios by uncoupling the return
to home assets from home labor income. Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) provide an
excellent review of this literature.10 As the focus of the present paper is on the role
of financial frictions for international portfolio choice and risk-sharing, I refrain
from extending the real sector of the model in such ways.
Figure 4.1 depicts different second-order properties of the model for varying
degrees of balance sheet exposure. The first graph shows the covariance of the
difference between stochastic discount factors of bankers, Ωt−1,t − Ω∗t−1,−t, and
the excess return on capital, Rx,t ≡ Rk,t −R∗k,t. As explained above, the portfolio
allocation chosen optimally by banks is the one which satisfies equation (4.24) up
to second-order accuracy. Hence, the first graph intersects the x-axis at point 0.62.
As it can be seen in the second plot of figure 4.1, the foreign asset share which
maximizes consumption risk-sharing, measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ), is approximately
1.47. Such a portfolio, i.e., γ > 1, reflects the hypothetical case that home banks go
short on home assets, i.e., that they channel funds from home firms to foreign firms.
This portfolio is equal to the portfolio which minimizes consumption volatility,
depicted in the third graph. Hence, the portfolio chosen by banks yields a lower
degree of consumption risk-sharing and higher consumption volatility than what
could be achieved in the given model.11
9With “standard” I refer to RBC models with commonly used shocks such as technology
shocks.
10Model features which can uncouple domestic labor income from domestic asset return are,
for example, sticky prices in combination with real exchange rate fluctuations and international
trade in nominal bonds (Engel and Matsumoto, 2009) or capital accumulation together with
international trade in capital goods (Coeurdacier et al., 2010).
11Considering this, it would be interesting to determine whether the portfolio chosen by banks is
welfare-inferior to a portfolio which maximizes risk-sharing and minimizes consumption volatilty.
Since consumption volatility is directly related to welfare and many papers have shown the gains
of international consumption risk-sharing for welfare (for an overview, see, e.g., van Wincoop,
1999), it seems likely. However, to obtain a definite answer to this question it would be necessary
to conduct a full-fletched welfare analysis. The solution method as explained in section 4.4 can,
of course, only be used to analyze first-order accurate macroeconomic dynamics. Nevertheless, it
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Figure 4.1: Portfolio Choice and Risk-Sharing
Why do bankers choose to hold too many home assets relative to what households
would prefer? The intuition for this result is as follows. Risk averse households
prefer to smooth their consumption streams. This generates a demand for assets
which promise a high payoff during bad states of the economy, which are usually
foreign assets. As mentioned above, various model features have been proposed to
uncouple the return to home equity from home labor income such that home agents
are inclined to hold a higher share of domestic assets. My model does not include
such features, which explains why foreign equity holdings must be high to provide
for optimal hedging of labor income risk and, hence, for optimal consumption risk-
sharing. Bankers inherit the preference for consumption smoothing from households,
however, this only explains one part of their motive. Additionally, they care about
the growth of their net worth which is generated through excess returns over
the risk-free rate. However, expected excess returns from home and foreign asset
holdings are equalized in expectations in this kind of model. Therefore, generally,
bankers cannot hedge their country-specific banking risk by holding a portfolio
which exhibits a large bias towards a certain class of assets. In addition, bank’s
balance sheets are subject to multiplier effects. Hence, bankers prefer smaller shocks
is straightforward to take the method to a higher order of approximation, as shown in Devereux
and Sutherland (2008; 2011a), which then allows to conduct a second-order approximation of the
model. Unfortunately, however, a welfare analysis based on this method seems to deliver spurious
welfare results when the particular model features large inefficiencies.
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to their balance sheet which also generates a motive to hold a rather diversified
(i.e., γB ≈ 0.5 ) portfolio.
As is well known and also supported by the results obtained in chapter 2,
international business-cycle correlations and, hence, risk-sharing properties of
internationally traded assets, strongly depend on the underlying sources of risk.
Therefore, to obtain a better understanding of the mechanisms driving the results,
it seems recommendable to look at the optimal portfolio holdings for different shock
structures. Table 4.2 provides figures on the optimal portfolio chosen by bankers,
γB, the risk-sharing maximizing portfolio, γRS, the actual risk-sharing obtained in
the model, i.e., corr(λt, λ
∗
t ) at γB, the highest possible risk-sharing in the model,
i.e., corr(λt, λ
∗
t ) at γRS, the difference between the latter two and the correlation
between the bankers’ and the households’ stochastic discount factors. The figures
are reported for the baseline model (all shocks) and for versions of the model which
feature only one type of shock each.
γB γRS Actual Potential Difference corr(Ω,Λ)
in % % risk-sharing risk-sharing (4)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 62 147 0.20 0.46 0.26 0.40
Only Ψt 64 150 0.20 0.49 0.29 0.81
Only At 41 125 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.49
Only Nt 496 414 -0.72 -0.69 0.03 -0.02
Risk-sharing is measured as corr(λ, λ∗).
Table 4.2: Portfolio Choice and Risk-Sharing for Different Shock Structures
First of all, it should be emphasized, that the optimal portfolio shares obtained
are very sensitive to the calibration of the shock processes.12 Hence, not to much
emphasis should be placed on the actual portfolio shares obtained. Nevertheless,
it is interesting to note, that the model exhibits home bias in equity holdings if
only technology shocks exist (Only At ), even though, for this kind of shock, foreign
capital assets provide a very good hedge for home labor income fluctuations. The
fact that the portfolio is biased towards home assets might be explained with the
relatively low correlation between Ωt−1,t and Λt−1,t compared to the scenario with
only capital quality shocks. The different correlations might be explained with
the fact that technology shocks mostly affect the real side of the economy and do
not provoke large financial acceleration effects compared to capital quality shocks
(cf. Gertler and Karadi, 2011). Table C.2 in the appendix shows the international
portfolios which would be chosen by households if the banking sector were absent
(γHH). It can be seen that households prefer similar portfolios in the presence
12E.g., increasing the persistency of the technology shock from 0.95 to 0.975 leads to γB > 0.5,
i.e., a foreign biased portfolio.
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of capital quality shocks and in the presence of technology shocks. Hence, the
comparatively low γB in the scenario in which only technology are present seems
to be driven by the fact that financial intermediaries undertake the international
portfolio decision in my model and that they are less affected by technology shocks
than households.
With respect to the risk-sharing implications of international portfolio choice
by banks, table 4.2 shows that actual consumption risk-sharing is always below
potential. As stated above, this can be explained with the fact that households’
and bankers’ motives deviate from each other which manifests itself in the less
than perfect correlation of stochastic discount factors, i.e., corr(Ωt−1,t,Λt−1,t)< 1,
as shown in column (6).
Furthermore, table 4.2 shows that when the correlation between the stochastic
discount factors is positive – meaning that the motives overlap to some extent –
the banker chooses a portfolio smaller than the one which maximizes international
consumption risk-sharing as has been explained above. The figures in the last row
reflect a world in which only shocks to the net wealth of bankers exist. In this
case, households’ and bankers motives are almost uncorrelated as the effects of the
net wealth shock – a purely financial shock – on the real economy are quite small
which has been already observed in chapter 2. The latter implies that varying the
portfolio does not have large effects on the real economy which can also explain
the small difference between actual and potential risk-sharing.
A further interesting implication of figures provided in table 4.2 is that in
the given model, even if the number of shocks corresponds to the number of
state-contingent securities, potential consumption risk-sharing is far from being
perfect. This deviates from what generally prevails in a model in which households
undertake the portfolio choice decision. It seems likely that this is also driven by
the existence of the financial friction.
To conclude, the assumption that bankers choose the international portfolio
has important implications for international portfolio choice and consumption
risk-sharing. Therefore, in the next section it is analyzed in how far the effects on
international portfolio choice and risk-sharing depend on the size of the financial
friction.
4.5.2 Size of the Financial Friction
The parameters governing the financial friction in this model are the divertable
fraction of assets, λb, the average lifetime of banks, θb, and the transfer to entering
bankers, ωb. Each parameter taken by itself has only little economic meaning,
however, jointly they determine the steady-state interest rate spread and the
steady-state leverage ratio which have empirical counterparts. It should be noted
that varying only one of the parameters into a certain direction, not necessarily
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increases or decreases the financial friction monotonically, in the sense that steady-
state spread and leverage ratio are pushed into the same direction. Therefore, I
analyze the effects of the size of the financial friction on international risk-sharing
by comparing the baseline scenario to three scenarios in which either a lower spread,
a lower leverage ratio or a lower spread and a lower leverage ratio prevail.
Table 4.3 sums up the effects of the parameter choices on the steady-state
values of the leverage ratio and the interest rate spread. In the “Lower spread”
scenarios, λb and ωb are chosen to ensure a steady-state interest rate spread of 100
basis points which Gertler and Karadi (2011, p. 25) report as the pre-crisis spread
“between mortgage rates and government bonds and between BAA corporate versus
government bonds”. In the “Lower leverage” scenarios, the parameters are chosen to
ensure a steady leverage ratio of three, which corresponds to the binding minimum
requirement in the European Union from 2018 onwards.
Baseline Lower Lower Lower
spread leverage spread &
leverage
Parameter setting:
divertable assets λb 0.486 0.331 0.526 0.409
transfer to new banks ωb 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.008
quarterly survival rate θb 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Steady state target:
leverage ratio QSH+Q
∗SF
N
4 4 3 3
interest rate spread (p.a.) 4 ln Rk
R
0.020 0.010 0.020 0.010
Table 4.3: Banking Sector Parameters
Table 4.4 shows how the size of the financial friction affects portfolio choice
and consumption risk-sharing. First, it should be noted that γB, the foreign equity
share chosen by banks, increases and moves closer to the risk-sharing maximizing
foreign equity share when the financial friction becomes smaller. This is in line
with the intuition given in section 4.5.1: When the financial friction decreases,
insuring against fluctuations in net wealth becomes relatively less important for
international portfolio choice. As table C.1 in the appendix shows, if only capital
quality or technology shocks are present, this is also reflected in a higher correlation
between the stochastic discount factors, i.e., an increase in corr(Ωt−1,t,Λt−1,t). As
table C.1 in the appendix also shows, portfolio choice and risk-sharing associated
with net wealth shocks, i.e., purely financial shocks are not significantly altered
by the reduction of the financial friction. Second, driven by the reduction of the
distance between γB and γRS, the gap between actual and potential risk-sharing is
reduced and, through the increase in γB, actual consumption risk-sharing increases.
What is not obvious at first sight is why the reduction of the financial friction
4.5. RESULTS 81
reduces γRS and potential risk-sharing. A shown in table C.2 in the appendix,
in the same model, but without a banking sector, a household would choose a
portfolio with a very large foreign bias and risk-sharing would be close to perfect.
This implies that whenever a financial friction exists, an decrease in the financial
friction generally decreases the risk-sharing potential of foreign assets.
γB γRS Actual Potential Difference corr(Ω,Λ)
in % % risk-sharing risk-sharing (4)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 62 147 0.20 0.46 0.26 0.40
Lower spread 68 118 0.24 0.35 0.11 0.45
Lower leverage 78 132 0.27 0.41 0.14 0.34
Both lower 85 113 0.28 0.32 0.04 0.37
Risk-sharing is measured as corr(λ, λ∗).
Table 4.4: Portfolio Choice and Risk-Sharing for Different Degrees of Financial
Frictions
To sum up, in the previous section it was shown that the existence of a financial
friction and the fact that financial intermediaries choose the foreign equity position
significantly reduce the degree of international consumption risk-sharing. Generally,
financial intermediaries choose to hold too many home assets. The analyses provided
in this section showed that a direct reduction of the financial friction brings the
foreign equity position closer to the one which yields the highest possible degree of
consumption risk-sharing in the given model. An obvious next step is to consider
the effects of macroprudential policy – designed to reduce the amplification of
shocks in the financial sector – on portfolio choice and international risk-sharing.
4.5.3 Macroprudential Policy
Macroprudential policy is modeled by introducing an instrument with similar effects
as a countercyclical capital buffer. Regarding the implementation of the capital
requirement, I follow Ghilardi and Peiris (2016) and Levine and Lima (2015) by
introducing a countercyclical subsidy on net worth, τNt , which adjusts in proportion
to variations in the credit-to-GDP-ratio13
ln(1 + τNt ) = −κτ ln
(
Bt/Yt
B/Y
)
, (4.26)
13Ghilardi and Peiris (2016) use foreign borrowing as an indicator variable and Levine and
Lima (2015) employ a whole set of different indicator variables in the macroprudential rule.
However, as it is generally agreed that macroprudential instruments should prevent excessive
credit development (see, e.g., Lang and Welz, 2017), the credit-to-GDP-ratio seems to be a natural
choice for an indicator variable in a macroprudential rule in the given model.
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where κτ = 0.1 and Y and B denote the steady-state values of output and banks’
assets, respectively.
In general, a subsidy on net worth changes the marginal cost of borrowing
from households. If implemented in a countercyclical fashion, the subsidy increases
whenever the economy performs below average, reducing lending costs, hence,
facilitating lending activities while it precludes the economy from overheating
during economic upswings by increasing the cost of borrowing.
Solving the banks’ maximization problem in the presence of the subsidy, the
marginal gain from net wealth (formerly given by equation (4.12)) changes to
ηt = EtΩt,t+1(Rt + τ
N
t ). (4.27)
On an aggregate level, only the net wealth of existing bankers (formerly given by
equation 4.6) is affected by the macroprudential subsidy, i.e.,
Ne,t = θb
[(
(Rk,t −Rt−1)− Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1
Bt−1
(Rk,t −R∗k,t)
)
φt−1 +Rt−1 + τNt−1
]
Nt−1.
(4.28)
Table 4.5 shows the effects of introducing a subsidy on net worth on portfolio
choice and consumption risk-sharing.14 As the results differ for each shock, the table
provides the results for different shock structures. Note that scenario in which only
net wealth shocks are present is omitted as the combination of only these shocks
together with a subsidy on the same variable leads to spurious results. The figures
contained in table 4.5 show that the introduction of a macroprudential instrument
designed to reduce the effects of a financial friction on the real economy does
not have the same implications on portfolio choice and risk-sharing as decreasing
the financial friction itself. In the baseline scenario and in the scenario with only
capital quality shocks, the difference between actual and potential risk-sharing is
reduced through the implementation of the macroprudential instrument. However,
actual risk-sharing decreases. Furthermore, the foreign equity share chosen by banks
becomes smaller. The opposite is true for technology shocks. Here, γB and actual
risk-sharing increase. However, the gap between actual and potential risk-sharing
becomes significantly larger.
A possible explanation for these results is the following. While only capital
quality shocks have a direct affect on banks’ balance sheets, the direct effects of
capital quality shocks and technology shocks on the real economy are similar (see
chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation). This explains why corr(Ωt−1,t,Λt−1,t) is
14The results presented in table 4.5 are qualitatively robust to varying the reaction coefficient,
κτ , within a range of commonly used values, to using the credit spread instead of the credit-to-
GDP-ratio as indicator variable in the macroprudential rule, and to using a different instrument,
which has also been used in this kind of model – a countercyclical tax on loans (see, e.g., Levine
and Lima, 2015).
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generally higher in the presence of only capital quality shocks than in the presence
of only technology shocks. The way macroprudential policy is modeled here, it
provides an insurance mechanism for the financial sector.15 Whenever the financial
sector is in a bad state it receives a subsidy and vice versa. Hence, the effects of
shocks on the financial sector are alleviated. This can explain, why in the scenario
with only capital quality shocks the correlation between the motives of bankers and
households, corr(Ωt−1,t,Λt−1,t), is significantly reduced while it is only marginally
affected in the scenario with only technology shocks. The insurance provided to
the banking system by the macroprudential instrument might also be the reason
why potential consumption risk-sharing becomes very high for technology shocks
(0.94). When repercussions in the financial sector are largely insured against by
macroprudential policy, the international portfolio could be used to primarily insure
against real sector repercussions, i.e., consumption fluctuations. For this it would
have to be quite high (γRS = 2.17), i.e., closer to the portfolio which would prevail
in a world without financial frictions.
γB γRS Actual Potential Difference corr(Ω,Λ)
in % % risk-sharing risk-sharing (4)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline
No macropru. 62 147 0.20 0.46 0.26 0.40
Macropru. 51 157 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.39
Only Capital Quality Shocks (Ψt )
No macropru. 64 150 0.20 0.49 0.29 0.81
Macropru. 51 147 0.11 0.28 0.17 0.61
Only Technology Shocks (At )
No macropru. 41 125 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.49
Macropru. 51 217 0.26 0.94 0.68 0.50
Table 4.5: Portfolio Choice and Risk-Sharing with Macroprudential Policy
To conclude, introducing macroprudential policy, designed to reduce the effects
of financial frictions on the real economy, does not have the same effects on inter-
national portfolio choice and consumption risk-sharing as reducing the financial
friction directly. In particular, while the latter generally induces financial interme-
diaries to hold more foreign assets which has a positive impact on international
consumption risk-sharing, this cannot be achieved through macroprudential policy,
the way it is modeled here. The reason is that the subsidy on net worth provides
an insurance mechanism to the financial sector which further increases the wedge
between the motives of bankers and households, especially if uncertainty is driven
by shocks with a large impact on the financial sector, i.e., capital quality shocks.
15This also applies to a countercyclical tax on loans, another instrument which has been used
in this kind of model.
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4.6 Conclusion
It is shown that the presence of leveraged financial intermediaries, choosing the
international equity portfolio instead of households, can explain relatively low
consumption risk-sharing compared to what could be achieved at the given level of
financial market integration. In particular, financial intermediaries choose to hold
too many home assets. Furthermore, under the assumption that technology shocks
are the only driving force behind business cycles, the model can replicate realistic
values of home bias in equity holdings. Considering that in the real world the
largest part of portfolio holdings is intermediated by funds (Coeurdacier and Rey,
2012), these results help reconcile theory with empirical evidence on relatively low
foreign asset holdings and modest degrees of international consumption risk-sharing
despite open financial markets (see, e.g., Kose et al., 2009).
In view of this, it is natural to ask whether policy can improve international
consumption risk-sharing, i.e., bring the outcome closer to what would prevail in a
world without financial frictions. It was shown that reducing the financial friction
directly induces financial intermediaries to hold more foreign assets which has a
positive impact on international consumption risk-sharing. However, reducing the
effects of the financial friction on the real economy through the introduction of
a countercyclical capital buffer does not have the same desirable consequences
for international consumption risk-sharing. The latter result should, however,
be interpreted with caution as it is not necessarily driven by the nature of a
countercyclical capital buffer itself, but by the way it is modeled here, i.e., as a
subsidy which provides an insurance mechanism to the financial system. In future
work, I plan to consider different ways of modeling macroprudential policy.
This paper is concerned with a key puzzle in international macroeconomics –
why international consumption risk-sharing is relatively low compared to what
could be achieved given the high level of international financial market integration.
It offers an explanation based upon the presence of leverage-constrained financial
intermediaries. In order to be able to draw normative implications from the positive
results presented here, it is necessary to compute welfare associated with portfolio
choice by financial intermediaries. The extension of the solution method used in
this paper cannot be used for this, as it seems to deliver spurious welfare results in
medium-scale models. Hence, it is left for further research to determine the welfare
effects of portfolio choice by financial intermediaries using a different solution
method.
A further open road for future research is the inclusion of additional shocks such
as preference shocks (different from financial shocks), e.g., a shock to the discount
factor of households. Given that these shocks have a direct effect on international
consumption risk-sharing, it will be interesting to see in how far the motives of
households and banks differ in the presence of such shocks.
Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 2
A.1 Banks’ Optimization Problem
Representative bank i chooses home assets, SiH,t, foreign assets, SiF,t and deposits
DBi,t to maximize its franchise value, Vi,t, subject to an incentive constraint, a
balance sheet constraint and a law of motion for net worth.
max
{SiH,t},{SiF,t},{DBi,t}
Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1[(1− θb)Ni,t + θbVi,t+1]
s.t. Vi,t ≥ λb(QtSiH,t +Q∗tSiF,t), (A.1)
QtSiH,t +Q
∗
tSiF,t = D
B
i,t +Ni,t, (A.2)
Ni,t = Rk,tQt−1SiH,t−1 +R∗k,tQ
∗
t−1SiF,t−1 −Rt−1DBi,t−1.(A.3)
In order to solve the optimization problem of the bank, we guess that the value
function is linear in home and foreign assets and net wealth
Vi,t = νiH,tQtSiH,t + νiF,tQ
∗
tSiF,t + ηi,tNi,t. (A.4)
Using this guess and assuming that the incentive constraint binds, the latter can
be expressed as
νiH,tQtSiH,t + νiF,tQ
∗
tSiF,t + ηi,tNi,t = λb(QtSiH,t +Q
∗
tSiF,t). (A.5)
The Lagrangian function of the maximization problem can be written as
L = νiH,tQtSiH,t + νiF,tQ∗tSiF,t + ηi,tNi,t
+λ [νiH,tQtSiH,t + νiF,tQ
∗
tSiF,t + ηi,tNi,t − (λb(QtSiH,t +Q∗tSiF,t))] .
Note that the Lagrangian function contains only one of the three constraints.
The remaining two, equations (A.2) and (A.3), will be used later. Given that the
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incentive constraint binds (λ > 0), the first-order conditions with respect to SiH,t,
SiF,t and λ are
νiH,t(1 + λ) = λbλ, (A.6)
νiF,t(1 + λ) = λbλ, (A.7)
(λb − νiH,t)QtSiH,t + (λb − νiF,t)Q∗tSiF,t = ηi,tNi,t. (A.8)
Note from (A.6) and (A.7) that
νiH,t = νiF,t ≡ νi,t. (A.9)
Hence, equation (A.8) becomes
QtSiH,t +Q
∗
tSiF,t =
ηi,t
λb − νi,tNi,t. (A.10)
Using the guess of the value function, equation (A.4), evaluated in t + 1, and
the results of the the maximization problem, the original value function can be
rewritten as
Vi,t =Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1(1− θb)Ni,t+1
+ Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1
[
θb(νiH,t+1Qt+1SiH,t+1 + νiF,t+1Q
∗
t+1SiF,t+1 + ηi,t+1Ni,t+1)
]
=Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1(1− θb)Ni,t+1
+ Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1θb(νi,t+1(Qt+1SiH,t+1 +Q
∗
t+1SiF,t+1) + ηi,t+1Ni,t+1).
Plugging in equation (A.10), the value function can be rewritten exclusively in
terms of individual net wealth
Vi,t = Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1
(
1− θb + θb(νi,t+1 ηi,t+1λb−νi,t+1 + ηi,t+1)
)
Ni,t+1.
Using the balance sheet constraint (equation (A.2)), the law of motion for net
worth (equation (A.3)) can be rewritten without deposits
Nit = (Rk,t −Rt−1)Qt−1SiH,t−1 + (R∗k,t −Rt−1)Q∗t−1SiF,t−1 +Rt−1Ni,t−1.(A.11)
Defining
Ωit,t+1 ≡ β(CA,t)Λt,t+1
[
(1− θb) + θb
(
ηi,t+1 + νi,t+1
ηi,t+1
λb − νi,t+1
)]
,
and plugging in equation (A.11) evaluated in t+ 1, one obtains
Vi,t = EtΩit,t+1
(
(Rk,t+1 −Rt)QtSiH,t + (R∗k,t+1 −Rt)Q∗tSiF,t +RtNi,t
)
.
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Comparing the previous equation to equation (A.4), the guess of the value function,
it can be verified that the value function is linear, with
νiH,t = EtΩit,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt),
νiF,t = EtΩit,t+1(R
∗
k,t+1 −Rt),
ηi,t = EtΩit,t+1Rt.
Assuming that in equilibrium all banks are symmetric, subscript i can be dropped,
i.e., ∀i, νiH,t = νH,t, νiF,t = νF,t, ηi,t = ηt and Ωit,t+1 = Ωt,t+1.
Aggregating over the incentive constraints of the representative banks and
taking into account that νH,t = νF,t, one obtains
νtBt + ηtNt = λbBt
⇔ Bt
Nt
=
ηt
λb − νt ≡ φt,
where φt, the ratio of intermediated assets to net worth, denotes the time-varying
leverage ratio.
A.2 Equilibrium Equations
A.2.1 Original Equilibrium Equations
The following equations constitute the equilibrium equations of the model. Note
that only home country equations are shown. Equations (A.12) to (A.16), (A.19)
to (A.35) and (A.37) to (A.39) have foreign counterparts while the goods market
clearing conditions is associated with an international goods market. Only one
aggregate resource constraint is sufficient to determine the equilibrium due to
Walras’ Law. Hence, there are in total 53 equations in 53 variables, β(CA,t), β(C
∗
A,t),
λt, λ
∗
t , Ct, C
∗
t , Rt, R
∗
t , Lt, L
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , Λt−1,t, Λ
∗
t−1,t, DF,t, Yt, Y
∗
t , Kt, K
∗
t , Rk,t,
R∗k,t, Qt, Q
∗
t , It, I
∗
t , f (·), f (·)∗, Bt, B∗t , φt, φ∗t , Nt, N∗t , ηt, η∗t , νt, ν∗t , Nn,t, N∗n,t,
Ne,t, N
∗
e,t, Ωt−1,t, Ω
∗
t−1,t, SH,t, SF,t, S
∗
H,t, S
∗
F,t, At, A
∗
t , Ψt, Ψ
∗
t , ΞN,t and Ξ
∗
N,t. Note
that in the representative agent framework, in equilibrium CA,t = Ct and C
∗
A,t = C
∗
t .
Households
1 = β(CA,t)EtΛt,t+1Rt (A.12)
Λt,t+1 =
λt+1
λt
(A.13)
λt = C
−1
t (A.14)
β(CA,t) = ωc(1 + CA,t)
−ηc (A.15)
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wt = χ
Lφt
λt
(A.16)
Rt = R
∗
t (1− ωd)DF,t (A.17)
Yt +Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1R
∗
k,t−1 −Qt−1S∗H,t−1Rk,t−1 +DF,t−1Rt−1 + 0.5(R∗t −Rt)DF,t
= Ct + [1 + f(·)]It +Q∗tSF,t −QtS∗H,t +DF,t
(A.18)
Banks
Bt = φtNt (A.19)
φt =
ηt
λb − νt (A.20)
Bt = QtSH,t +Q
∗
tSF,t (A.21)
Ne,t = θb
[(
(Rk,t −Rt−1)− Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1
Bt−1
(Rk,t −R∗k,t)
)
φt−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1, (A.22)
Nn,t = ωb(Qt−1SH,t−1 +Q∗t−1SF,t−1) (A.23)
Nt = Nn,t +Ne,t ΞN,t (A.24)
νH,t = EtΩt,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt) (A.25)
ηt = EtΩt,t+1Rt (A.26)
EtΩt,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1R
∗
k,t+1 (A.27)
Ωt,t+1 = β(CA,t)Λt,t+1 [(1− θb) + θb (ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1)] (A.28)
Final Goods Firms
Yt = At(ΨtKt−1)αL1−αt (A.29)
Kt = It + (1− δ)ΨtKt−1, (A.30)
Rk,t+1 =
αYt+1
Kt
+ (1− δ)Ψt+1Qt+1
Qt
(A.31)
wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(A.32)
Capital Goods Producers
f (·) = ηI
2
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)2
δKt−1
It
(A.33)
Qt = 1 + ηI
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)
(A.34)
A.2. EQUILIBRIUM EQUATIONS 89
Market Clearing Conditions
QtKt = Qt(SH,t + S
∗
H,t) (A.35)
Yt + Y
∗
t = Ct + C
∗
t + [1 + f(·)]It + [1 + f ∗(·)]I∗t (A.36)
Exogenous Processes
ln Ψt = ρΨ ln Ψt−1 + Ψt (A.37)
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + At (A.38)
ln ΞN,t = ρN ln ΞN,t−1 + Nt (A.39)
A.2.2 Modified Equilibrium Equations
To solve the model with the method proposed by Devereux and Sutherland
(2007; 2008; 2011a), it needs to be rewritten such that portfolio holdings always
appear in a product with future excess returns. More specifically, to be able to
solve for foreign capital shares directly, the equations are rewritten in a way that
Q∗tSF,t
Bt
and
QtS∗H,t
B∗t
always appear in a product with future excess returns. Then, I
replace
Q∗t−1SF,t−1
Bt−1
(Rk,t − R∗k,t) and
Qt−1S∗H,t−1
B∗t−1
(Rk,t − R∗k,t) by γξt (this procedure
is described in section 4.4). The resulting set of equilibrium equations contains
three equations less: The home and foreign capital market clearing conditions,
(A.35) and (A.35*), are replaced by one international capital market clearing
condition (equation (A.61)). Equation (A.21) and its foreign counterpart are
dropped. Only one portfolio choice equation (equation (A.27)) is needed to solve
for the equilibrium, hence, the foreign counterpart (equation (A.27*)) is dropped.
An equation defining ξt as pure white noise is added. Variables SH,t, SF,t, S
∗
H,t and
S∗F,t are no longer part of the equilibrium.
Households
1 = β(CA,t)EtΛt,t+1Rt (A.40)
Λt,t+1 =
λt+1
λt
(A.41)
λt = C
−1
t (A.42)
β(CA,t) = ωc(1 + CA,t)
−ηc (A.43)
wt = χ
Lφt
λt
(A.44)
Rt = R
∗
t (1− ωd)DF,t (A.45)
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Yt −Rk,tQt−1Kt−1 +Rk,tφt−1Nt−1 +DF,t−1Rt−1 + 0.5(R∗t −Rt)DF,t
Bt−1
− γξt
=
Ct + [1 + f(·)]It + φtNt −QtKt +DF,t
Bt−1
(A.46)
Final Goods Firms
Yt = At(ΨtKt−1)αL1−αt (A.47)
Kt = It + (1− δ)ΨtKt−1, (A.48)
Rk,t+1 =
αYt+1
Kt
+ (1− δ)Ψt+1Qt+1
Qt
(A.49)
wt = (1− α)Yt
Lt
(A.50)
Capital Goods Firms
f (·) = ηI
2
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)2
δKt−1
It
(A.51)
Qt = 1 + ηI
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)
Banks
Bt = φtNt (A.52)
φt =
ηt
λb − νt (A.53)
Ne,t = θb [((Rk,t −Rt−1)− γξt)φt−1 +Rt−1]Nt−1 (A.54)
Nn,t = ωbBt−1 (A.55)
Nt = Nn,t +Ne,t ΞN,t (A.56)
νH,t = EtΩt,t+1(Rk,t+1 −Rt) (A.57)
ηt = EtΩt,t+1Rt (A.58)
EtΩt,t+1Rk,t+1 = EtΩt,t+1R
∗
k,t+1 (A.59)
Ωt,t+1 = β(CA,t)Λt,t+1 [(1− θb) + θb (ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1)] (A.60)
Market Clearing Conditions
QtKt +Q
∗
tK
∗
t = QtBt +Q
∗
tB
∗
t (A.61)
Yt + Y
∗
t = Ct + C
∗
t + [1 + f(·)]It + [1 + f ∗(·)]I∗t (A.62)
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Exogenous Processes
ln Ψt = ρΨ ln Ψt−1 + Ψt (A.63)
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + At (A.64)
ln ΞN,t = ρN ln ΞN,t−1 + Nt (A.65)
ξt = 
ξ
t (A.66)
A.3 Further Impulse Responses
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Figure A.1: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Technology Shock
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Figure A.2: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Net Wealth Shock
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A.4 Robustness Analyses
A.4.1 Higher Bond Market Integration
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Figure A.3: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Capital Quality Shock with
Higher Bond Market Integration (ωd = 0.001)
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Figure A.4: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Technology Shock with
Higher Bond Market Integration (ωd = 0.001)
A.4.2 Two-Good Model with Sticky Prices
The following impulse responses result from a two-country model with trade in
imperfectly substitutable home and foreign final goods and nominal rigidities. The
household sector is modeled exactly as in the original model, except for the fact
that households now consume a basket consisting of home and foreign goods. There
is no home bias in consumption. As in chapter 3, the elasticity of substitution
between home and foreign goods, denoted by ι, is set to four. However, as the trade
elasticity seems to matter greatly for the transmission of technology shocks, I also
provide the impulse responses to a home technology shock under the assumption of
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a lower trade elasticity of ι = 1.5 (see figure A.8). Furthermore, it is assumed that
final goods prices are sticky. Imperfect price adjustment is modeled as proposed
by Calvo (1983). As in chapter 3, the probability of keeping prices fixed, denoted
by θ, is set to 0.779 and the elasticity of substitution between varieties, , is set
to 4.167. Banks and capital goods producing firms are modeled exactly as in the
original model. Final goods are now produced in a two-stage production process,
however, the production function remains unchanged. It should be noted that
financial market autarky (red lines) no longer implies full autarky, as two goods
are traded.
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Figure A.5: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Capital Quality Shock in a
Two-Good Model with Sticky Prices (ι = 4)
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Figure A.6: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Technology Shock in a
Two-Good Model with Sticky Prices (ι = 4)
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Figure A.7: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Net Wealth Shock Shock in
a Two-Good Model with Sticky Prices (ι = 4)
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Figure A.8: Impulse Responses to an Adverse 1% Home Technology Shock in a
Two-Good Model with Sticky Prices and a Lower Trade Elasticity (ι = 1.5)
Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 3
B.1 CES Portfolio Choice
The asset portfolio of bank i, Bi,t, consists of home as well as foreign assets which
are combined according to the following CES aggregator
Bi,t =
(
µ
1
ιb
b (QtSiH,t)
ιb−1
ιb + (1− µb)
1
ιb (Q∗tSiF,t)
ιb−1
ιb
) ιb
ιb−1
. (B.1)
The corresponding price index, which specifies the average expected return on the
asset portfolio, RAt , in terms of the expected returns of the home and foreign assets,
Rk,t and R
∗
k,t, is given by
1
RAt
=
µb( 1
Rk,t
)1−ιb
+ (1− µb)
(
1
R∗k,t
)1−ιb
ιb
ιb−1
. (B.2)
The optimal home and foreign asset purchases can be obtained by finding the
minimum of the following equation
1
RAt+1
Bi,t = Et
{
Rk,t+1QtSiH,t +R
∗
k,t+1Q
∗
tSiF,t
}
⇔ Bi,t = Et
{
RAt+1
Rk,t+1
QtSiH,t +
RAt+1
R∗k,t+1
Q∗tSiF,t
}
, (B.3)
subject to equation (B.1). Expressions
RAt+1
Rk,t+1
and
RAt+1
R∗k,t+1
can be interpreted as relative
expected asset prices. Equation (B.3) can be interpreted as expectation-adjusted
portfolio expenditures. Minimizing expectation-adjusted portfolio expenditures is
essentially the same as maximizing expected portfolio returns. Solutions to the
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optimization problem are given by the following asset demand equations
QtSiH,t = µbEt
(
Rk,t+1
RAt+1
)ιb
Bi,t, (B.4)
Q∗tSiF,t = (1− µb)Et
(
R∗k,t+1
RAt+1
)ιb
Bi,t. (B.5)
B.2 Equilibrium Equations
B.2.1 Equilibrium Equations without Central Bank Credit
Policy
The following equations constitute the equilibrium equations of the model.
Note that only home country equations are shown. Equations (B.12), (B.13),
(B.17),(B.20), (B.21) and (B.45) do not have foreign counterparts. Hence, there
are in total 84 equations in 84 variables, β(CA,t), β(C
∗
A,t), λt, λ
∗
t , Ct, C
∗
t , Rt, R
∗
t ,
Lt, L
∗
t , wt, w
∗
t , Λt−1,t, Λ
∗
t−1,t, DF,t, Yt, Y
∗
t , Kt, K
∗
t , Rk,t, R
∗
k,t, Qt, Q
∗
t , It, I
∗
t , f (·),
f (·)∗, Bt, B∗t , φt, φ∗t , Nt, N∗t , ηt, η∗t , νt, ν∗t , Nn,t, N∗n,t, Ne,t, N∗e,t, Ωt−1,t, Ω∗t−1,t, SH,t,
SF,t, S
∗
H,t, S
∗
F,t, R
A
t , R
∗A
t , it, i
∗
t , i
CB
t , pi
int
t , In,t, I
∗
n,t, CH,t, CF,t, C
∗
H,t, C
∗
F,t, pH,t, pF,t,
Πt, ΠH,t, ΠF,t, Π˜H,t, Π˜F,t, Ym,t, Y
∗
m,t, Pm,t, P
∗
m,t, Ut, U
∗
t , δ(Ut), δ(U
∗
t ), ∆p,t, ∆
∗
p,t, Xt
X∗t , At, A
∗
t , Ψt, Ψ
∗
t , ΞN,t and Ξ
∗
N,t. Note that pH,t ≡ PH,tPt =
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
, pF,t ≡ PF,tPt =
P ∗F,t
P ∗t
,
Π˜H,t ≡ P˜H,tPH,t−1 and Πt is union-wide consumer price inflation.
Households
β(CA,t) = ωc(1 + CA,t)
−ηc (B.6)
λt = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − β(CA,t)h(EtCt+1 − hCt)−1 (B.7)
1 = β(CA,t)EtΛt,t+1Rt (B.8)
it = i
CB
t (1− ωdDF,t) (B.9)
wt = χ
Lφt
λt
(B.10)
Λt,t+1 =
λt+1
λt
(B.11)
pH,tYt +Q
∗
t−1SF,t−1R
∗
k,t −Qt−1S∗H,t−1Rk,t +DF,t−1
it−1
Πt
+ ΥIFIt
= Ct +DF,t + [It + f
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
)
(In,t + I)]
+Q∗tSF,t −QtS∗H,t + 0.5(Γm,t + Γf,t) (B.12)
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ΥIFIt = −
(
1
Φ(−DF,t) − 1
)
DF,t
iCBt
(B.13)
CH,t = 0.5p
−
H,tCt (B.14)
CF,t = 0.5p
−
F,tCt (B.15)
1 =
(
0.5p1−ιH,t + 0.5p
1−ι
F,t
) 1
1−ι (B.16)
Πt = ΠH,t
pH,t−1
pH,t
(B.17)
Banks
1
RAt
=
µb( 1
Rk,t
)1−ιb
+ (1− µb)
(
1
R∗k,t
)1−ιb
ιb
ιb−1
(B.18)
Bt =
(
µ
1
ιb
b (QtSH,t)
ιb−1
ιb + (1− µb)
1
ιb (Q∗tSF,t)
ιb−1
ιb
) ιb
ιb−1
(B.19)
QtSH,t = µbEt
(
Rk,t+1
RAt+1
)ιb
Bt (B.20)
Q∗tSF,t = (1− µb)Et
(
R∗k,t+1
RAt+1
)ιb
Bt (B.21)
νt = EtΩt,t+1(R
A
t+1 −Rt) (B.22)
ηt = EtΩt,t+1Rt (B.23)
Bt = φtNt (B.24)
φt =
ηt
λb − νt (B.25)
Nt = Nn,t +Ne,tΞN,t (B.26)
Ne,t = θb
[
(RAt −Rt−1)φt−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1 (B.27)
Nn,t = ωbBt−1 (B.28)
Ωt,t+1 = β(CA,t)Λt,t+1 [(1− θb) + θb (ηt+1 + νt+1φt+1)] (B.29)
Intermediate Goods Firms
Ym,t = At(UtΨtKt−1)αL1−αt (B.30)
Kt = It + (1− δ(Ut))ΨtKt−1 (B.31)
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wt = (1− α)Pm,tYm,t
Lt
(B.32)
δ′(Ut)ΨtKt−1 = Pm,tα
Ym,t
Ut
(B.33)
Rk,t+1 =
αPm,t+1Ym,t+1
Kt
+ (Qt+1 − δ(Ut+1))Ψt+1
Qt
(B.34)
δ(Ut) = δu +
b
1 + ζ
U1+ζt (B.35)
Capital Goods Firms
f
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
)
=
ηI
2
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
− 1
)2
(B.36)
In,t = It − δ(Ut)ΨtKt−1 (B.37)
Qt = 1− f(·) + In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
f ′(·)− Etβ(CA,t)Λt,t+1
(
In,t+1 + I
In,t + I
)2
f ′(·) (B.38)
Final Goods Firms
Xt =
pH,t
Pm,t
(B.39)
Π˜H,t =

− 1
Et
∑∞
k=0 θ
kΘkλt+kΠ

H,t,t+kΠ
−θpi
H,t−1,t+k−1Yt+kPm,t+k
Et
∑∞
k=0 θ
kΘkλt+kΠ
−1
H,t,t+kΠ
(1−)θpi
H,t−1,t+k−1Yt+kpH,t+k
ΠH,t (B.40)
Ym,t = Yt∆p,t (B.41)
∆p,t = θ∆p,t−1ΠH,tΠ
−θpi
H,t−1 + (1− θ)
(
1− θΠ−1H,t Πθpi(1−)H,t−1
1− θ
) 
−1
(B.42)
ΠH,t =
(
θΠ
θpi(1−)
H,t−1 + (1− θ)Π˜1−H,t
) 1
1−
(B.43)
Central Bank
it = RtEtΠt+1 (B.44)
iCBt =
(
βΠγpit X
−0.5γy
t X
∗−0.5γy
t
)1−ρi (
iCBt−1
)ρi
εM,t (B.45)
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Market Clearing
QtKt = Qt(SH,t + S
∗
H,t) (B.46)
Yt = CH,t + C
∗
H,t + p
−1
H,t[It + f
(
In,t + I
In,t−1 + I
)
(In,t + I)] (B.47)
Exogenous Processes
Ψt = (1− ρΨ) + ρΨΨt−1 + Ψt (B.48)
At = (1− ρA) + ρAAt−1 + At (B.49)
ΞN,t = (1− ρN) + ρNΞN,t−1 + Nt (B.50)
B.2.2 Additional Equilibrium Equations with Central
Bank Credit Policy
Liquidity Facilities
In the model with liquidity facilities, there are nine additional variables, Mt, M
∗
t ,
Rm,t, R
∗
m,t, ηm,t, η
∗
m,t, Γm,t, Φm,t and Φ
∗
m,t (if it is assumed that the central bank
follows a union-wide rule, there is only one union-wide Φm,t, hence, only eight
additional variables). Correspondingly, nine (or eight, in the case of a union-wide
rule) equations are added to the system of equations which was laid out in subsection
B.2.1 (only home country equations will be displayed). Equation (B.55) does not
have a foreign counterpart, as intervention costs accrue to the union-wide central
bank.
ηm,t = EtΩt,t+1(Rm,t −Rt). (B.51)
ηm,t = λmνt, (B.52)
Mt = Φm,tBt. (B.53)
Policy rule for Φm,t (B.54)
Γm,t = τ1(Mt +M
∗
t ) + τ2(M
2
t +M
∗2
t ) (B.55)
Equations (B.24) and (B.27) are replaced.
Bt = φtNt + λmMt (B.24’)
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Ne,t = θb
[
(RAt −Rt−1)
φt−1
1− λmΦm,t−1 − (R
m
t−1 −Rt−1)
φt−1Φm,t−1
1− λmΦm,t−1 +Rt−1
]
Nt−1
(B.27’)
Corporate Sector Credit Policy
In the model with corporate sector credit policy, there are five additional variables,
Ft, F
∗
t , Γf,t, Φf,t and Φ
∗
f,t (if it is assumed that the central bank follows a union-
wide rule, there is only one union-wide Φf,t, hence, only four additional variables).
Correspondingly, five (or four, in the case of a union-wide rule) equations are
added to the system of equations which was laid out in subsection B.2.1 (only
home country equations will be displayed). Equation (B.58) does not have a foreign
counterpart, as intervention costs accrue to the union-wide central bank. Equation
(B.46) needs to be replaced.
Ft = Φf,tQtKt (B.56)
Policy rule for Φf,t (B.57)
Γf,t = τ1(Ft + F
∗
t ) + τ2(F
2
t + F
∗2
t ) (B.58)
(1− Φf,t)QtKt = Qt(Sh,t + S∗h,t) (B.46’)
Furthermore, in the case of any central bank credit policy, variables Tt and T
∗
t
and the following equation and its foreign counterpart are added to the system of
equilibrium equations.
0.5(Γm,t + Γf,t) +Mt +Ft = Tt + (Rm,t−1−Rt−1)Mt−1 + (Rk,t−Rt−1)Ft−1 (B.59)
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B.3 Further Welfare Tables
κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -0.03 - 0.59 5.655 1.424 0.707 0.0382 0.333 0.0207
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 0 -0.03 0 0.59 5.655 1.424 0.707 0.0382 0.333 0.0207
LF, un. 0 -0.03 0 0.59 5.655 1.424 0.707 0.0382 0.333 0.0207
CCP, cou. 43 -0.02 0.02 0.59 5.654 1.415 0.707 0.0342 0.333 0.0146
CCP, un. 132 0.03 0.06 0.50 5.656 1.385 0.707 0.0335 0.333 0.0153
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 40 0.92 0.95 0.53 5.725 1.379 0.708 0.0334 0.333 0.0304
LF, un. 40 0.67 0.70 0.51 5.701 1.392 0.708 0.0336 0.333 0.0284
CCP, cou. 139 1.50 1.53 0.70 5.770 1.333 0.710 0.0270 0.333 0.0505
CCP, un. 135 1.11 1.14 0.52 5.741 1.354 0.709 0.0294 0.333 0.0473
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table B.1: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Only Capital Quality
Shocks)
κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -0.16 - 0.41 5.667 1.419 0.707 0.0323 0.333 0.0127
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 330 -0.15 0.02 0.39 5.667 1.418 0.707 0.0317 0.333 0.0139
LF, un. 330 -0.15 0.02 0.39 5.667 1.417 0.707 0.0317 0.333 0.0136
CCP, cou. 330 -0.14 0.02 0.40 5.667 1.414 0.707 0.0317 0.333 0.0140
CCP, un. 330 -0.14 0.02 0.39 5.667 1.412 0.707 0.0317 0.333 0.0136
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 23 -0.12 0.04 0.39 5.670 1.417 0.707 0.0312 0.333 0.0146
LF, un. 26 -0.12 0.04 0.38 5.669 1.417 0.707 0.0312 0.333 0.0145
CCP, cou. 139 -0.08 0.09 0.42 5.675 1.412 0.707 0.0273 0.333 0.0155
CCP, un. 139 -0.09 0.07 0.33 5.674 1.414 0.707 0.0285 0.333 0.0160
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table B.2: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Only Technology Shocks)
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κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - 0.12 - 0.45 5.669 1.409 0.707 0.0076 0.333 0.0133
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 13 0.21 0.09 0.38 5.674 1.405 0.708 0.0067 0.333 0.0104
LF, un. 13 0.18 0.07 0.29 5.673 1.406 0.708 0.0069 0.333 0.0113
CCP, cou. 7 0.22 0.10 0.36 5.674 1.405 0.708 0.0068 0.333 0.0103
CCP, un. 7 0.19 0.07 0.29 5.673 1.406 0.708 0.0069 0.333 0.0113
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 13 0.16 0.04 0.37 5.671 1.407 0.708 0.0073 0.333 0.0108
LF, un. 13 0.15 0.03 0.36 5.671 1.407 0.708 0.0073 0.333 0.0115
CCP, cou. 10 0.17 0.05 0.33 5.672 1.407 0.708 0.0072 0.333 0.0096
CCP, un. 7 0.15 0.04 0.37 5.671 1.407 0.708 0.0073 0.333 0.0116
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities.
κm: optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in
percent of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional
policy. International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the
stochastic steady state of the given variable.
Table B.3: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Only Net Wealth Shocks)
κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -3.61 - 1.00 5.603 1.518 0.703 0.0334 0.331 0.0754
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 92 -3.07 0.55 1.00 5.651 1.495 0.705 0.0237 0.332 0.0393
LF, un. 92 -3.07 0.55 1.00 5.651 1.495 0.705 0.0237 0.332 0.0393
CCP, cou. 284 -2.04 1.57 1.00 5.670 1.160 0.706 0.0163 0.332 0.0267
CCP, un. 284 -2.04 1.57 1.00 5.670 1.160 0.706 0.0163 0.332 0.0267
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 89 1.66 5.28 1.00 5.894 1.336 0.712 0.0270 0.333 0.0331
LF, un. 89 1.66 5.28 1.00 5.894 1.336 0.712 0.0270 0.333 0.0331
CCP, cou. 139 2.63 6.24 1.00 5.947 1.290 0.715 0.0231 0.334 0.0204
CCP, un. 139 2.63 6.24 1.00 5.947 1.290 0.715 0.0231 0.334 0.0204
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table B.4: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Only Monetary Policy
Shocks)
B.3. FURTHER WELFARE TABLES 107
κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -3.92 - 0.61 5.217 1.220 0.687 0.0620 0.328 0.0807
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 56 -3.44 0.48 0.58 5.547 1.404 0.701 0.0555 0.331 0.0489
LF, un. 83 -3.34 0.59 0.54 5.599 1.420 0.703 0.0550 0.332 0.0466
CCP, cou. 330 -2.19 1.74 0.56 5.716 1.233 0.707 0.0475 0.333 0.0354
CCP, un. 304 -2.14 1.78 0.50 5.709 1.008 0.706 0.0501 0.333 0.0360
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 63 2.63 6.55 0.63 5.878 1.198 0.709 0.0532 0.333 0.0573
LF, un. 69 2.04 5.97 0.56 5.889 1.267 0.710 0.0542 0.333 0.0549
CCP, cou. 139 4.60 8.53 0.64 6.056 1.039 0.715 0.0439 0.335 0.0598
CCP, un. 135 3.55 7.47 0.54 6.025 1.175 0.715 0.0492 0.334 0.0552
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table B.5: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Domestic Credit Provision)
κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -3.75 - 0.84 5.601 1.529 0.702 0.0575 0.331 0.0819
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 56 -3.31 0.44 0.78 5.646 1.519 0.704 0.0517 0.332 0.0527
LF, un. 73 -3.23 0.52 0.82 5.642 1.516 0.704 0.0504 0.332 0.0496
CCP, cou. 218 -1.99 1.76 0.76 5.674 1.211 0.706 0.0461 0.332 0.0395
CCP, un. 211 -2.20 1.55 0.80 5.662 1.249 0.705 0.0454 0.332 0.0394
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 53 2.09 5.84 0.79 5.922 1.315 0.711 0.0509 0.332 0.0573
LF, un. 69 2.23 5.98 0.82 5.943 1.311 0.712 0.0490 0.333 0.0566
CCP, cou. 139 3.73 7.48 0.81 6.045 1.230 0.716 0.0434 0.334 0.0577
CCP, un. 135 3.75 7.50 0.81 6.041 1.232 0.716 0.0435 0.334 0.0569
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table B.6: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Fully Diversified Portfolio,
µA = 0.5)
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κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -0.10 - 0.98 5.648 1.428 0.707 0.0339 0.333 0.0208
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 0 -0.10 0 0.98 5.648 1.428 0.707 0.0339 0.333 0.0208
LF, un. 0 -0.10 0 0.98 5.648 1.428 0.707 0.0339 0.333 0.0208
CCP, cou. 116 0.14 0.25 0.96 5.656 1.402 0.707 0.0288 0.333 0.0137
CCP, un. 76 -0.06 0.04 0.98 5.646 1.428 0.707 0.0294 0.333 0.0147
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 30 0.57 0.68 0.93 5.692 1.396 0.708 0.0298 0.333 0.0230
LF, un. 43 0.61 0.71 0.98 5.697 1.395 0.708 0.0284 0.333 0.0296
CCP, cou. 152 1.06 1.16 0.96 5.739 1.356 0.709 0.0235 0.333 0.0488
CCP, un. 149 1.08 1.19 0.98 5.737 1.356 0.709 0.0234 0.333 0.0478
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities. κm:
optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in percent
of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional policy.
International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the stochastic
steady state of the given variable.
Table B.7: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Fully Diversified Portfolio,
µA = 0.5; Only Capital Quality Shocks)
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κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
No UMP - -3.69 - 0.70 5.609 1.524 0.702 0.0606 0.331 0.0803
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 17 -3.67 0.02 0.68 5.626 1.532 0.704 0.0575 0.332 0.0608
LF, un. 17 -3.67 0.02 0.67 5.625 1.533 0.703 0.0576 0.332 0.0610
CCP, cou. 50 -2.85 0.84 0.67 5.661 1.451 0.705 0.0528 0.332 0.0440
CCP, un. 59 -2.78 0.90 0.64 5.667 1.431 0.705 0.0529 0.332 0.0429
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 23 1.13 4.82 0.69 5.912 1.337 0.710 0.0579 0.332 0.0639
LF, un. 26 1.05 4.74 0.68 5.899 1.343 0.710 0.0574 0.332 0.0621
CCP, cou. 50 3.03 6.71 0.71 5.992 1.279 0.714 0.0510 0.333 0.0557
CCP, un. 53 2.77 6.46 0.66 5.975 1.288 0.714 0.0518 0.333 0.0541
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities.
κm: optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in
percent of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional
policy. International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the
stochastic steady state of the given variable.
Table B.8: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Higher Intermediation
Costs, τ1 = 0.000313, τ2 = 0.0031)
κf , g Rel. Risk- K N C vol(C) L vol(L)
κm gain sharing
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
no UMP - -3.69 - 0.70 5.609 1.524 0.702 0.0606 0.331 0.0803
Rule 1 - Credit Spread Rule
LF, cou. 0 -3.69 0.00 0.70 5.609 1.524 0.702 0.0606 0.331 0.0803
LF, un. 0 -3.69 0.00 0.70 5.609 1.524 0.702 0.0606 0.331 0.0803
CCP, cou. 23 -3.24 0.45 0.68 5.655 1.493 0.705 0.0552 0.332 0.0506
CCP, un. 26 -3.21 0.48 0.66 5.659 1.487 0.705 0.0553 0.332 0.0496
Rule 2 - Credit Growth Rule
LF, cou. 13 0.03 3.71 0.69 5.891 1.356 0.708 0.0599 0.331 0.0712
LF, un. 13 0.02 3.71 0.70 5.867 1.365 0.708 0.0598 0.331 0.0713
CCP, cou. 23 2.11 5.80 0.70 5.944 1.313 0.712 0.0553 0.332 0.0580
CCP, un. 26 1.94 5.63 0.67 5.935 1.319 0.712 0.0551 0.332 0.0564
No UMP: no unconventional monetary policy. LF: liquidity facilities. CCP: corporate credit policy.
Cou.: country-specific. Un.: union-wide. κf : optimal feedback coefficient for liquidity facilities.
κm: optimal feedback coefficient for credit policy. g: welfare gains in consumption equivalents in
percent of steady-state consumption. Relative gain: difference in g to case without unconventional
policy. International risk-sharing is measured as corr(λt, λ
∗
t ). Columns (5)-(7) and (9) display the
stochastic steady state of the given variable.
Table B.9: Optimal Simple Rules in a Symmetric Setup (Higher Intermediation
Costs, τ1 = 0.000625, τ2 = 0.0062)

Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 4
C.1 Further Tables
γB γRS Actual Potential Difference corr(Ω,Λ)
in % % risk-sharing risk-sharing (4)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Only Capital Quality Shocks (Ψt )
Baseline banks 64 150 0.20 0.49 0.29 0.81
Lower spread 68 118 0.24 0.36 0.12 0.90
Lower leverage 78 131 0.30 0.45 0.15 0.76
Both lower 85 112 0.31 0.35 0.04 0.85
Only Technology Shocks (At )
Baseline banks 41 125 0.25 0.44 0.18 0.49
Lower spread 52 110 0.30 0.40 0.10 0.57
Lower leverage 51 120 0.26 0.41 0.15 0.51
Both lower 68 108 0.33 0.39 0.05 0.56
Only Net Wealth Shocks (Nt )
Baseline banks 496 414 -0.72 -0.69 0.03 -0.02
Lower spread 466 420 -0.66 -0.66 0.01 -0.00
Lower leverage 510 393 -0.76 -0.69 0.07 0.00
Both lower 477 398 -0.70 -0.67 0.03 0.01
Risk-sharing is measured as corr(λ, λ∗).
Table C.1: Portfolio Choice and Risk-Sharing for Different Degrees of Financial
Frictions under Different Shock Structures
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γHH Risk-Sharing
in %
(1) (2)
Baseline 741 0.997
Only capital quality shocks (Ψt ) 748 1.000
Only technology shocks (At ) 699 1.000
Risk-sharing is measured as corr(λ, λ∗).
Table C.2: Optimal Risk-Sharing in Model without a Financial Friction
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